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Charles L. Babcock * and Bryan C. Collins**
I. AccESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
URING the Survey period a number of important judicial decisions
construed the Texas Open Records Act,1 the Texas Open Meetings
Act,2 the Federal Freedom of Information Act,3 and the rights of
access to government information, which the Texas 4 and United States Con-
stitutions grant all citizens. 5 In addition, the Seventieth Session of the Texas
* A.B., Brown University, J.D., Boston University. Attorney at Law, Jackson, Walker,
Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
** A.B., Stanford University, J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Jackson,
Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
1. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1988). The policy declara-
tion set forth in § 1 of the Texas Open Records Act provides:
Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of
representative government which holds to the principle that government is the
servant of the people, and not the master of them, it is hereby declared to be the
public policy of the State of Texas that all persons are, unless otherwise ex-
pressly provided by law, at all times entitled to full and complete information
regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent
them as public officials and employees. The people, in delegating authority, do
not give their public servants the right to decide what. is good for the people to
know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining
informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have cre-
ated. To that end, the provisions of this Act shall be liberally construed with the
view of carrying out the above declaration of public policy.
Id.
2. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp. 1988). Section 2(a) of the
Texas Open Meetings Act provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act or specifically permitted in the Consti-
tution, every regular, special, or called meeting or session of every governmental
body shall be open to the public; and no closed or executive meeting or session
of any governmental body for any of the purposes for which closed or executive
meetings or sessions hereinafter authorized shall be held unless a quorum of the
governmental body has first been convened in open meeting or session for which
notice has been given as hereinafter provided and during which open meeting
the presiding officer has publicly announced that a closed or executive meeting
or session will be held and identified the section or sections under this Act au-
thorizing the holding of such closed or executive session.
Id.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
4. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 8. This section provides in part that "prosecutions for the pub-
lication of papers, investigating the conduct of officers or men in public capacity, or when the
matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence."
Id.
5. The first amendment to the United States Constitution states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
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Legislature passed important amendments to the Open Meetings and Open
Records Acts.6
A federal court, curiously enough, decided the most important case under
the Texas Open Records Act during the Survey period. In Kneeland v. Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association 7 three Dallas news organizations
(WFAA-TV, The Dallas Times Herald, and The Dallas Morning News)
sought records from the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
and the Southwest Conference (SWC) concerning football recruiting viola-
tions of Southwest Conference schools pursuant to the Open Records Act.
The NCAA and the SWC refused to release the documents claiming that
they were not governmental bodies under the Act and therefore should not
be subject to the Act.8 The news organizations filed suit in state district
court in Travis County, claiming a right to the documents under the Open
Records Act9 as well as the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. section
1983. The defendants removed the case to federal court based upon federal
question jurisdiction. 10
United States District Court Judge James Nowlin held that the news orga-
nizations were not entitled to the documents under their federal cause of
action, but ordered the release of a majority of the documents under the
Texas Open Records Act.1" In a lengthy opinion, the court held that the
Open Records Act applied to the NCAA and the SWC by virtue of section
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text discussing amendments.
7. 650 F. Supp. 1047 (W.D. Tex. 1986).
8. Section 3(a) of the Texas Open Records Act states that "[a]ll information collected,
assembled, or maintained by governmental bodies pursuant to law or ordinance or in connec-
tion with the transaction of official business is public information and available to the public
during normal business hours of any governmental body .. " TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252-17a, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The Act defines governmental body as meaning:
(A) any board, commission, department, committee, institution, agency, or of-
fice within the executive or legislative branch of the state government, or which
is created by either the executive or legislative branch of the state government,
and which is under the direction of one or more elected or appointed members;
(B) the commissioners court of each county and the city council or governing
body of each city in the state;
(C) every deliberative body having rulemaking or quasi-judicial power and
classified as a department, agency or political subdivision of a county or city;(D) the board of trustees of every school district and every county board of
school trustees and county board of education;
(E) the governing board of every special district;(F) the part, section, or portion of every organization, corporation, commis-
sion, committee, institution, or agency which is supported in whole or in part by
public funds, or which expends public funds, public funds as used herein shall
mean funds of the State of Texas or any governmental subdivision thereof;
(G) the Judiciary is not included within this definition.
Id. § 2(1).
9. The plaintiffs claimed that the NCAA and the SWC were indeed governmental bodies
as defined by the Act in § 2(l)(F). See supra note 8. The main issue in the determination of
whether the defendants were governmental bodies became, therefore, whether they were "sup-
ported in whole or in part by public funds, or [whether they] expend[ed] public funds." TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 2(l)(F).
10. 650 F. Supp. at 1050.
11. Id. at 1054-55, 1090.
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2(1)(F). 12 The court found that public funds from state universities sup-
ported both the NCAA and SWC in part and that the organizations spent
public funds of the State of Texas.' 3
The Dallas Morning News also sued the private university members of the
Southwest Conference,14 claiming they too were subject to the Texas Open
Records Act.' 5 The trial court granted summary judgment for the private
universities and the Texas court of appeals affirmed the decision.16 The case
currently is pending on a writ application before the Texas Supreme
Court. 17
In Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones 18 the Dallas Times Herald sought
to unseal the pleadings, judicial orders, and opinions in a civil case. The
newspaper alleged that it was entitled to access to the records pursuant to
the Texas Constitution or the freedom of the press clause of the first amend-
ment.' 9 The trial court refused to release the records. 20 On appeal, the Dal-
las court of appeals assumed that there was a first amendment right of access
to judicial pleadings in a civil case, but the court nonetheless affirmed the
district court's sealing order because the pleadings contained a settlement
agreement between the parties to the suit.2' The court relied upon the state's
substantial interest in promoting settlements. 22
The Texas Supreme Court granted a writ of error and vacated the lower
courts' decisions.23 The court held that the trial court and the court of ap-
peals had erred in assuming jurisdiction since the newspaper filed its motion
to unseal the documents after the trial court had lost plenary power over its
judgment.24 Following this decision, the Dallas Morning News published a
two-part series which detailed widespread sealing of records at the Dallas
County Courthouse. 25 In the wake of this article, the Honorable John Mar-
shall, presiding judge of the Dallas district courts, promulgated administra-
12. Id. at 1063.
13. Id. at 1059-63.
14. The private university members of the Southwest Conference are Southern Methodist
University, Texas Christian University, William Marsh Rice University, and Baylor
University.
15. A. H. Belo Corp. v. Southern Methodist Univ., 734 S.W.2d 720, 720-21 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1987, application for writ pending).
16. Id. at 720.
17. The court of appeals held the private universities not governmental bodies as defined
by the Texas Open Records Act since they were neither supported by public funds, nor did
they expend public funds. Id. at 723.
18. 717 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986) (en banc), vacated, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.
1987) (per curiam).
19. The district court had sealed the records of a settled civil suit (to which the Dallas
Times Herald was not a party). The parties in the suit had conditioned their settlement agree-
ment upon the sealing of the records. The Times Herald contended that the sealing order
abridged its rights under art. I, § 8 of the Texas Constitution, see supra note 4, as well as
violated the first amendment to the United States Constitution. See supra note 5.
20. 717 S.W.2d at 934.
21. Id. at 938, 940.
22. Id. at 939-40.
23. 730 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1987).
24. Id. at 649.
25. The Dallas Morning News, Nov. 22, 23, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
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tive rules that substantially curtailed the ability of parties or the court to seal
documents.26
The issue of sealed judicial pleadings arose again in Federal Savings &
Loan Insurance Corp. v. Blain.27 The parties in Blain agreed to place the
terms of their preliminary injunction under seal. The Federal Savings &
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) subsequently moved to remove the
seal. The district court partially granted the FSLIC's motion to unseal, 28
and Blain appealed, the decision. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision, stating that the district court should exercise its discretion-
ary authority to seal the record of judicial proceedings in a cautious man-
ner.29 The court characterized the area of the sealing of the record of
judicial proceedings as a "legal minefield."' 30 The Fifth Circuit based its af-
firmance, however, on the fact that the defendant had disclosed the terms of
the injunction to a third party.31 The defendant, therefore, waived his right
to confidentiality, and he could not complain of the district judge's order to
unseal the records. 32
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also decided a
record sealing case that dealt with physical access to plea and sentencing
hearings in connection with espionage charges against an alien. In In Re
Washington Post Co. 33 the court held that The Washington Post newspaper
had a first amendment right of access to plea and sentencing hearings and to
documents filed in connection with the hearings. 34 The court of appeals
26. Id.
27. 808 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1987).
28. Id. at 397.
29. Id. at 399. The court acknowledged, however, that certain situations warrant the use
of the seal and cited Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (broad-
casters denied access to White House tapes since first amendment does not grant press a right
to information about a trial superior to that of the general public).
30. 808 F.2d at 399. The court exemplified its characterization by citing several cases:
First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 475-77 (3d Cir.
1986) (en banc) (state procedure limiting public access to judicial disciplinary proceedings not
unconstitutional under first amendment); In re Reports Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773
F.2d 1325, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (postponement of reporters' access to discovery documents
in civil suit until after trial did not violate first amendment); United States v. Hubbard, 650
F.2d 293, 294, 322-25 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (seal of documents seized during criminal investigation
should not have been lifted in absence of substantial showing to justify public access).
31. 808 F.2d at 400.
32. Id. The court wrote: "Breach of the seal is akin to pregnancy; there is no such thing
as an insignificant amount." Id.
33. 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986).
34. Id. at 390. In its analysis, the court observed that the Supreme Court and the courts
of appeals have looked to two factors in determining whether a first amendment right of access
extends to a particular kind of hearing:
historical tradition and the function of public access in serving important public
purposes. In the first inquiry, the court asks whether the type of proceedings at
issue has traditionally been conducted in an open fashion. In the second in-
quiry, the court asks whether public access to the proceeding would tend to
operate as a curb on prosecutorial or judicial misconduct and would further the
public's interest in understanding the criminal justice system.
Id. at 389. The court performed an examination of relevant case law and a weighing of histori-
cal and functional considerations in reaching its conclusion that the first amendment right of
access extended to the hearings involved. Id.
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found that the district judge had failed to comply with the procedural re-
quirements that the court of appeals had set forth in In re Knight Publishing
Co. 35 First, the district court did not give public notice of the government's
closure motions.3 6 Second, when the Post nonetheless learned of the closure,
the district court deprived the press of the opportunity to voice objections to
the closed hearings. 37 Third, the district court failed to state reasons on the
record, including specific findings and a discussion of alternatives to closure
of the hearings or sealing of the documents. 38
The Texas Legislature provided the most important development in the
open meetings area during the Survey period. In 1985, the attorney general
ruled that a commissioner's court could bar video cameras from a public
meeting held pursuant to the Open Meetings Act.39 The attorney general
noted that a 1973 amendment to the Act granted the public the right to
record a meeting by "sonic" means.40 The attorney general noted, however,
that the statute was completely silent regarding the right to videotape meet-
ings. The attorney general held that in the absence of a specific provision
permitting the public to videotape its meetings, the commissioner's court
could disallow the videotaping of its meetings held pursuant to the Open
Meetings Act.41 The legislature overturned the attorney general's decision
and amended the act to provide:
All or any part of the proceedings in any public meeting of any govern-
mental body as defined hereinafter may be recorded by any person in
attendance by means of a tape recorder, video camera, or any other
means of sonic or visual reproduction. 42
During the Survey period the First District of the Houston court of ap-
peals entertained the Open Meetings Act in the employment contract con-
text. In James v. Houston Independent School District43 a teacher received
notice that the school district was attempting to modify her "continuing con-
tract." The teacher requested a public hearing pursuant to the Open Meet-
ings Act, but the school district never provided her with one. The court of
appeals found that the board's actions violated the Open Meetings Act and,
therefore, could not be ratified.44 Furthermore, the court found that the
35. 743 F.2d 231, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1984).
36. 807 F.2d at 392.
37. Id.
38. Id. The court strengthened its findings by pointing out that "although the (Supreme]
Court has not addressed the question of notice, it has held that a district courts' closure order
must be supported by a clear statement of reasons, with specific findings, including a discussion
of possible alternatives considered and rejected by the court." Id. (citing Press Enterprise I.,
464 U.S. 501, 510-11 (1984)).
39. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-3512 (1985).
40. Act of April 11, 1973, art. 6252-17, ch. 31, § 2(i), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 45, 46 states
that "[a]ll or any part of the proceedings in any public meeting of any governmental body as
defined hereinabove may be recorded by any person in attendance by means of a tape recorder
or any other means of sonic reproduction."
41. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-3512 (1985).
42. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 549, § 2 (1987). Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 4412, 4413 (Vernon).
43. 742 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
44. Id. at 707.
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offensive actions were subject to judicial intervention.45 The court of appeals
determined that the school board's action was invalid and rendered sum-
mary judgment in favor of the teacher.46
The attorney general of Texas determines the applicability of the Open
Records Act to information that it is requested to examine as well as the
availability of exemptions under the Act.47 In addition, the attorney general
issues opinions interpreting the Open Meetings Act. The following discus-
sion summarizes attorney general decisions rendered during the Survey pe-
riod under the two Acts.
A. The Open Meetings Act
JM-595. On behalf of the Dallas Area Rapid Transit Authority (DART),
the Honorable Henry Wade, criminal district attorney, asked the attorney
general whether the Open Meetings Act authorized DART to discuss, in
closed executive session, the written evaluations and recommendations of
staff personnel. The writings contained information regarding DART's se-
lection of professional consultants, DART's selection of competitive bidders,
and DART's awarding of contracts to professional consultants and competi-
tive bidders. The attorney general first held that meetings of DART's board
are subject to the Texas Open Meetings Act.48 The DART board suggested
that a constitutional executive privilege empowered the board to discuss in-
teragency memoranda in executive sessions. President Nixon prominently
raised the issue of executive privilege regarding conversations between high
governmental officials, particularly the President of the United States and his
immediate advisors.49 The attorney general asserted that the issue of
whether or not the Texas Constitution provides such a privilege has not been
decided. 50 The claimed privilege, therefore, did not authorize the closing of
the meeting of the DART board.51 The attorney general also rejected the
board's contention that since the executive discussions concerned documents
exempt from disclosure under section 3(a)(l1) of the Open Records Act,
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
48. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-595 (1986). The DART Authority acknowledged that
its board of directors meetings were subject to the Open Meetings Act. The Act defines meet-
ing as "any deliberation between a quorum of members of a governmental body ... at which
any public business or public policy over which the governmental body has supervision or
control is discussed or considered, or at which any formal action is taken .... " TEX. REV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § l(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The attorney general defined DART as
a "special district" within the meaning of "governmental body" of § 1(c) of the Act. JM-595
at 2.
49. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974). In Nixon the Supreme Court recog-
nized that a constitutionally based privilege protects confidential communications between
high government officials. Id. at 705-06, 715-16.
50. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-595 at 4 (1986).
51. Id. Specifically, in matters regarding discovery proceedings, Texas law treats legisla-
tively created special districts in the same manner as private litigants. Id. (citing Lowe v.
Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 300-01 (Tex. 1976); Texas Dep't of Corrections v. Herring,
513 S.W.2d 6, 7-9 (Tex. 1974)).
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then the exception should be engrafted onto the Open Meetings Act.52
JM-596. The Chairman of the Committee on Natural Resources of the
Texas House of Representatives asked the attorney general to determine
whether the Texas Open Records Act and the Texas Open Meetings Act
govern nonprofit water supply corporations.5 3 The attorney general noted
that sections 15.006, 16.002, and 17.000 of the Water Code require water
supply corporations that receive financial assistance from the state to comply
with the Open Records and Open Meetings Act. 54 The attorney general
held that the law did not require nonprofit water supply corporations not
subject to the referenced water code provisions to comply with the Open
Meetings Act or the Open Records Act.55 The attorney general noted, how-
ever, that the Texas Nonprofit Corporation Act56 subjects nonprofit corpo-
rations in Texas, such as the water supply corporations, to public inspection
of financial records of the corporation. 57
JM-640. The question in this opinion concerned whether the Open Meetings
Act requires the Polygraph Examiners Board to conduct licensing examina-
tions in closed session and whether the Open Records Act embraced the
board's questions and examinee's answers.58 In addition, the Polygraph Ex-
aminers Board requested to determine whether the board could bar examin-
ees from hearing other examinees' questions and answers. After finding that
the board is subject to the Open Meetings Act, 59 the attorney general deter-
mined that a board session held solely for the purpose of a licensing exami-
nation is not a deliberation or meeting within the meaning of the Act.6° The
attorney general further held that the board could withhold examination
questions that it had not yet given. 61 Finally, the attorney general found
that the board, pursuant to its statutory grant of authority, could prevent an
examinee from hearing another examinee's questions. 62
JM-645. This opinion dealt with whether the Open Meetings Act authorizes
individual commissioners of the Texas Public Utilities Commission (PUC)
to stay the effect of an order entered by a hearings examiner in a docketed
case pending an appeal. The attorney general found that the Open Meetings
Act requires a public hearing before the commission can grant such a stay.
63
52. Id.
53. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-596 (1986).
54. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 15.006, 16.002, 17.002 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
55. JM-596 at 2-4.
56. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 1396-2.23, 2.23A (Vernon 1980).
57. JM-596 at 5-7.
58. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-640 (1987).
59. Id. at 1.
60. Id. at 2, 3.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id.
63. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-645 at 3 (1987). The attorney general stated that § 12 of
art. 1446c of the Texas Civil Statutes required the commission to exercise its power to stay
interim orders as a body and not as individual commissioners acting independently. Id.; see
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1988). PUC meetings conducted
1988]
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The PUC further asked whether the Open Meetings Act permitted it to con-
duct proceedings involving disputed claims of privilege or confidentiality in
camera. The attorney general concluded that the commission can conduct
an in camera examination of documents or hold a closed meeting to decide a
claim of privilege in a contested case under the same circumstances that a
court can engage in an in camera review of allegedly privileged documents.64
The attorney general based its decision upon an exception to the Open Meet-
ings Act for contested administrative proceedings. 65
JM-740. This opinion dealt primarily with the selection of a county auditor
in Harris County. The attorney general held that a meeting of the district
judges of Harris County for the purpose of selecting a county auditor is not a
meeting of a "governmental body" as that term is defined in the Open Meet-
ings Act.66 Meetings of this nature, therefore, are not covered by the provi-
sions of the Act.6 7
JM-757. The attorney general held that the Texas Open Records Act does
not give members of the public an unlimited right to copy, with their own
copying equipment, information that the Open Records Act deems public. 68
The attorney general held, however, that an agency may only deny a reques-
tor's right to copy information with the requestor's own copying equipment
when the request presents doubts regarding safety or efficiency or threatens
the unreasonable disruption of the business of the governmental body. 69 The,
attorney general concluded that the facts of each request determined
whether the particular agency could grant or deny a given request. 70
JM-794. The attorney general addressed the issue of whether meetings of
the board of directors of a health facilities corporation created pursuant to
article 15280) of the Health Facilities Development Act71 were subject to
the Open Meetings Act. The attorney general held that the corporation did
not fall within the definition of a governmental body under the Texas Open
Meetings Act.72 The corporation, therefore, need not comply with the
Act.7 3
as a body must be conducted in accordance with the Open Meetings Act, and the Open Meet-
ings Act expressly provides that meetings of governmental bodies shall be open to the public.
JM-645 at 2; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
64. JM-645 at 4.
65. "[W]e conclude that the contested case procedural requirements in the Administrative
Procedure and Texas Register Act, article 6252-13a, V.T.C.S., creates an exception to the
Texas Open Meetings Act with regard to contested cases." Id.
66. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-740 (1987).
67. Id.
68. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. JM-757 (1987).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 6.
71. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528 (Vernon 1988).




B. Open Records Act
The following attorney general decisions deal exclusively with requests for
information under the Texas Open Records Act.
ORD-440. The Austin Police Department received a request for access to
records concerning a police department investigation into allegations of sex-
ual abuse of children at the Texas School for the Deaf.74 The attorney gen-
eral held that section 34.08 of the Family Code75 provided for the
confidentiality of the requested material. 76 The attorney general further held
in the alternative that a common law right of privacy probably excepted the
information from disclosure. 77
ORD-441. The attorney for the Austin Independent School District (AISD)
asked the attorney general to determine whether the district should release
information concerning AISD personnel who had not informed the school
district that they had passed the Texas Examination of Current Administra-
tors and Teachers Test (TECAT).78 An attorney for two teachers who were
involved in litigation attempting to have TECAT invalidated filed a brief
arguing that the information was exempt because of a protective order filed
in the teacher litigation. The attorney general disagreed in construing the
language of the order. 79 The attorney general also rejected an argument by
the teachers that the release of the information was clearly an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.80
ORD-442. The attorney general held that section 3.06 of the Communicable
Disease Prevention and Control Act81 did not exempt the disclosure of in-
formation that the Texas Department of Health collected regarding a shigel-
74. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-440 (1986).
75. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.08 (Vernon 1975).
76. ORD-440 at 2; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, §§ 3(a)(1), (a)(3)
(Vernon Supp. 1988), which except information determined to be confidential as a matter of
law and information relating to litigation, respectively.
77. ORD-440 at 2.
78. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-441 (1986).
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id The teachers based this argument on TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a,
§ 3(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988), which prohibits the release of information in personnel files
when such a disclosure would clearly constitute an unjustifiable invasion of personal privacy.
In his rebuttal of this argument, the attorney general cited Hubert v. Harte-Hanks Tex. News-
papers, Inc., 652 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Hubert case
established that § 3(a)(2) only protects personnel file information if the release of the records
would create a tort action for invasion of privacy as set forth in Industrial Found. v. Texas
Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976). 652 S.W.2d at 558. Industrial Foundation
established that information is deemed confidential by law if "(1) the information contains
highly intimate or embarrassing facts the publication of which would be highly objectionable
to a reasonable person, and (2) the information is not of legitimate concern to the public." 540
S.W.2d at 685. The attorney general found that the public had a legitimate interest in know-
ing whether or not a teacher possessed the basic skills necessary to pass the TECAT and,
therefore, under Hubert § 3(a)(2) did not protect the information. ORD-441 at 3. The attor-
ney general asserted that as long as a legitimate public interest existed, the fact that disclosed
information was highly intimate or embarrassing was irrelevant. Id.
81. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 3.06 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
19881
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losis outbreak. 82 Section 3(a)(1) of the Open Records Act prohibits the
disclosure of information that a statute deems confidential.8 3 The attorney
general stated, however, that section 3.06 of the Communicable Disease Pre-
vention and Control Act does not protect from disclosure those investigative
reports that section 3.07 of the Act requires.84
ORD-443. The city of Electra requested an opinion from the attorney gen-
eral concerning whether the city should grant a citizen's request for the
city's utility bill ledgers.8 5 The records indicated which customers were de-
linquent in their accounts. The city maintained that the information was
exempt from disclosure on privacy grounds. The attorney general rejected
this argument and held that the city had to release the requested
information.8 6
ORD-444. The Orange Leader, a local newspaper, requested some personnel
file information from the Orange County sheriff's office concerning two em-
ployees in the sheriff's office.87 The sheriff argued that section 3(a)(2) of the
Open Records Act protected this information because the disclosure would
involve a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The attorney
general rejected the sheriff's argument and ordered the sheriff to release the
information on the ground that the public has a legitimate interest in infor-
mation regarding the qualifications and performances of governmental em-
ployees.88 This assertion is especially true when the information regards
employees in sensitive positions, such as members of the sheriff's depart-
ment.89 The newspaper also requested information on disciplinary actions
concerning five employees. The sheriff resisted this request, arguing that re-
lease of the information would unduly interfere with law enforcement and
prosecution. 90 He also claimed that release of the information would ham-
per contemplated litigation.9' The attorney general ordered the sheriff's de-
82. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-442 at 3 (1986).
83. See supra note 76.
84. ORD-442 at 3.
85. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-443 (1986).
86. Id. at 4. Citing Industrial Found. v. Texas Indus. Accident Board, 540 S.W.2d 668
(Tex. 1976), the attorney general asserted:
[A]nyone who is delinquent in his utility payments to the city of Electra owes a
debt to a governmental entity rather than to a private party. Although the pub-
lic may have no legitimate interest in private debts, we believe it has a genuine
interest in knowing who owes money to the city, as this information will enable
the public to gain some insight into the manner in which the city handles the
task of revenue collection and may spur the public to attempt to influence city
officials to perform that task differently.
Id. at 3-4; see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
87. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-444 (1986).
88. Id. at 3.
89. Id. In rejecting the § 3(a)(2) argument, the attorney general propounded the same
legitimacy argument that he had asserted in ordinances 441 and 443, citing Hubert v. Harte-
Hanks Tex. Newspapers, Inc. 652 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e. and
Industrial Found. v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd. 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976). See supra notes
80 & 86 and accompanying text.
90. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
91. See id. § 3(a)(3).
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partment to release the information unless it submitted "compelling"
reasons justifying withholding the information within five days. 92 The Or-
ange Leader also asked for information concerning a shooting incident that
the sheriff contended was the subject of a pending criminal case and was,
therefore, protected from public disclosure. The attorney general faulted the
sheriff for not providing sufficient information to identify the pending crimi-
nal case and ordered the sheriff to submit the information within five days.9 3
Finally, the newspaper requested information regarding reasons for dismis-
sal, promotion, and demotion of sheriff department employees. The attorney
general stated that the public has an obviously legitimate interest to know
why a public employee is dismissed, demoted, or promoted94 and, therefore,
found that the sheriff's department should release the information.9 5
ORD-445. The city attorney of Midland inquired whether the Open
Records Act requires a governmental body to obtain and disclose informa-
tion that is collected and maintained by an outside consultant whom the city
hired. 96 The city of Midland had contracted with a consulting firm to study
its police department. The firm submitted a final report to the city that the
city made public. The city received a request for access to the consultant's
notes and work papers. The attorney general held that section 3(a) of the
Act 97 did not subject the information to disclosure because the city never
possessed the requested information and did not know the contents of the
information requested. 98 Furthermore, the attorney general distinguished
this case from one in which the governmental entity assembled the informa-
tion and then gave that information to an outside entity in order to circum-
vent the disclosure requirements of the Act.99
ORD-446. The Texas Credit Union Department received a request for a
large amount of financial data. 100 The credit union claimed exemption pur-
suant to section 3a(12) of the Open Records Act. 10 1 The attorney general
agreed with the credit union, holding that the section applies to information
about the current and projected financial condition and operations of a
credit union. 102
92. ORD-444 at 5; see Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-319 (1982) (governmental body must show
compelling reason to withhold information).
93. ORD-444 at 5.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 6-7.
96. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-445 (1986).
97. See supra note 8 for the text of this provision of the Open Records Act.
98. ORD-445 at 2.
99. Id.
100. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-446 (1986).
101. Id. at 2. Section 3(a)(12) of the Open Records Act provides:
information contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition re-
ports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions, and/or securities, as that term
is defined in the Texas Securities Act;
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(12) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
102. ORD-446 at 3; see Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-187 (1978).
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ORD-447. This request dealt with materials relating to an investigation of
alleged wrongdoing by an employee of the University of Texas Athletic De-
partment. The request sought copies of any reports relating to the employee
that the university may have filed with the National Collegiate Athletic As-
sociation. The university contended that it should not release any of the
requested reports containing information concerning students because of the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,103 which the Texas
Open Records Act incorporates through section 14(e). The university fur-
ther contended that the privacy provisions of section 3(a)(1) of the Act pro-
tected the information. The attorney general found that section 14(e) of the
Act protects from disclosure only those materials "directly related to a stu-
dent." 10 4 The attorney general then addressed whether section 3(a)(1) sub-
jected the remaining materials to disclosure. The attorney general prefaced
his determinations by noting that section 3(a)(1) contains a constitutional as
well as a common law right of privacy. The attorney general held that the
constitutional right of privacy only protects information relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and the upbringing
and education of children. 0 5 The attorney general asserted, therefore, that
information regarding NCAA violations and alleged violations of NCAA
rules was not included among the constitutionally protected privacy inter-
ests. 10 6 The attorney general also rejected the common law privacy argu-
ment and criticized a prior decision of the attorney general's office, ORD-
142.107
ORD-448. The city of El Paso requested an opinion as to whether it must
provide the home address of a public employee to the Child Support En-
forcement Bureau of another state. The attorney general found that section
3(a)(17) of the Open Records Act protected the information from disclo-
sure.10 8 The attorney general held, however, that the city had properly pro-
vided the employee's social security number and verified dates of
employment and work address. 109 The city was correct, the attorney general
held, in refusing to release the employee's home address under the authority
of section 3(a)(17).110
ORD-449. The attorney general advised the chairman of the Unauthorized
Practice of Law Committee of the State Bar of Texas regarding whether the
Open Records Act subjected the committee's decisions to disclosure. The
attorney general noted that the governmental body (in this case the Unau-
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1982).
104. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-447 at 3 (1986).
105. Id. at 4.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 6-7. In Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-142 (1976) the attorney general found a common
law right of privacy existed that prevented the disclosure of minutes of a University of Texas
Southwest Athletic Conference meeting at which certain individuals had been reprimanded
and censured for violating Southwest Conference regulations. Id. at 4.





thorized Practice of Law Committee of the State Bar) had not asked for a
decision pursuant to the provisions of the Act. The attorney general held
that in the absence of such a request it had no jurisdiction to decide the
question. " I'
ORD-450. The Huntsville Independent School District requested a decision
concerning whether a school district must release notes taken by an ap-
praiser during an evaluation of instructional personnel. The attorney gen-
eral first noted that the Act governed the requested information, but that
most of the materials consisted of advice, opinions, and recommendations
and were, therefore, excepted from disclosure under section 3(a)(l 1) of the
Act. " 12 The attorney general held, however, that the section 3(a)(l 1) exemp-
tion would not apply if the information consisted merely of objective obser-
vations of facts and events." 13
ORD-451. An attorney asked the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy
to release information pertaining to his client, a certified public accountant
against whom a complaint was pending. The state board argued that the
information had been assembled in anticipation of litigation, and therefore
section 3(a)(3) of the Open Records Act exempted it from disclosure. The
attorney general found, however, that article 41a-l, section 25 required that
the records be released.' 14 Since the licensee authorized a designated person,
his attorney, to inspect the information, the board could not withhold the
information under section 25. 11
ORD-452. Parents of children in the Houston Independent School District
(HISD) asked for documents relating to the location of recently repainted
school desks and chairs. The parents sought the information because they
were concerned that the HISD had repainted certain desks with leaded
paint, a violation of federal law. The district prepared one of the documents
upon the parents' request and the custodian claimed that this document was,
therefore, not subject to disclosure. The attorney general agreed. 1 6 With
regard to the remaining documents, however, the attorney general held that
because of the potential violation of federal law and various threats of litiga-
tion, section 3(a)(3) of the Act exempted all of the remaining documents
from the public. 117
ORD-453. This request dealt with whether the General Land Office could
withhold the identity of those individuals who received bid packets for the
offer of real estate controlled by the Texas Board of Corrections. The land
111. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-449 at 2 (1986).
112. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-450 at 4 (1986).
113. Id.
114. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-451 at 3 (1986); see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 41a-1,
§ 25 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
115. ORD-451 at 3.
116. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-452 at 3 (1986).
117. Id. at 6.
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office requested an attorney general opinion as to whether the section 3(a)(4)
exception under the Open Records Act, dealing with information that would
give advantage to competitors or bidders, applied.11 8 The land office relied
heavily upon the attorney general opinion MW-591, but the attorney general
rejected that decision and held that MW-591 must be limited to its particular
facts.' 19 The attorney general also noted that the section 3(a)(4) exception is
to be construed narrowly and, therefore, ordered the land office to release
the information.1 20
ORD-454. The Dallas city attorney requested an opinion as to whether the
family of the victim that a policeman fatally shot may gain access to the
police department's investigative report regarding the shooting after the po-
lice department selectively disclosed the report to the police officer who shot
the victim. The attorney general held that the Open Records Act section
3(a)(3) exception embraced the report and, therefore, protected it from dis-
closure.1 21 Since the city had a legal duty to release the report to the police
officer, the city had, therefore, not waived the section 3(a)(3) protection.1 22
The attorney general qualified his opinion on the fact that the victim's family
had not shown a real likelihood of litigation over the shooting.123
ORD-455. A number of governmental bodies asked the attorney general to
construe certain of the Sixty-ninth Legislature's amendments to the Open
Records Act. Pursuant to these amendments, section 3(a)(17) excepted
from public disclosure the home addresses and home telephone numbers of
each official and employee of a governmental body except as section 3(a)
otherwise provides. Section 3(a) provides that governmental employees and
officials should choose whether or not to allow public access to the informa-
tion in the custody of the governmental body relating to the officials' or the
employees' home addresses and home telephone numbers. The requesting
governmental bodies asked the attorney general to state whether the provi-
sions applied to former governmental employees who, while still employed,
elected not to disclose the information. In addition, the governmental bodies
asked the attorney general whether section 3(a) protected applicants for gov-
ernment employ.
The attorney general found that the legislature did not contemplate appli-
cants for employment as being within the scope of the amendments.124 As
to former employees, the attorney general found that the protection of the
statute does not cease when the employment relationship ends. The attorney
general then addressed the issue of whether section 3(a)(1) of the Act dealing
118. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-453 (1986).
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id. at 4. Section 14(d) of the Open Records Act states that its provisions are to be
"liberally construed in favor of the granting of any request for information." TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 14(d) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
121. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-454 at 7 (1986).
122. Id. at 2-4.
123. Id.
124. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-455 at 2 (1987).
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with personal privacy excepted certain personnel information from disclo-
sure. The attorney general found that the Act allows the public to access the
following types of personal information concerning government employees:
educational training, names and addresses of former employers, dates of em-
ployment, the kind of work, salary per month, reasons for leaving, the
names, occupations, addresses, and telephone numbers of character refer-
ences, job preferences or abilities, and the names of friends or relatives who
are employed by the government. 125 The attorney general found that infor-
mation regarding a governmental employee's illnesses, operations within the
past year, and physical handicaps is intimate personal information that sec-
tion 3(a)(1) exempts from disclosure. 126 Finally, the attorney general found
that applicants for government jobs could not expect a governmental body to
withhold their birthdates, height, weight, marital status, or social security
numbers. 127
ORD-456. The police chief of the city of Houston requested an opinion as to
the availability of forms relating to businesses that employ off-duty police
officers. The forms contained information regarding businesses that felt they
needed extra security and had, therefore, hired off-duty police officers. The
forms specified the location, type, and reputation of specific businesses. Fur-
thermore, the forms specified whether the officer wears his or her uniform
while on the job. The police department claimed exception under section
3(a)(3) of the Open Records Act, which deals with the release of information
that interferes with the enforcement of the law and the prevention of crime.
The police department claimed that the forms would indicate which busi-
nesses were not protected by extra police personnel and, therefore, had in-
dependent significance to law enforcement activities. The attorney general
agreed that the section 3a(8) exception protected the information. 28
ORD-457. This request dealt with whether the name of the arresting officer
on an expunged arrest report is excepted from disclosure. The attorney gen-
eral found that the information was excepted from disclosure under article
55.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with expunged records. 129
Article 55.03 prohibits the release, dissemination, or use of oppugned
records subsequent to an entry of expunction order.
ORD-458. A requestor asked the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners
to release information regarding complaints against licensees. The attorney
general noted that the request did not seek information about actual com-
plaints, but rather statistical information concerning complaints that did not
reveal the identity of the subjects of the complaints. 30 Although article
125. Id. at 8.
126. Id. at 9.
127. Id.
128. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-456 at 3 (1987).
129. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-457 at 1-2 (1987); see TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
55.03, § (1) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
130. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-458 at 3 (1987).
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4495b, section 4.05(d) of the Medical Practices Act protects information
about actual complaints, it is silent on whether statistical information can be
revealed.' 3 ' The attorney general held that section 4.05(d) did not apply to
the statistical information since the intent of the confidentiality provisions is
to protect the identities of licensees who have complaints filed against
them. 132
ORD-459. The Midland city attorney asked whether the Open Records Act
required him to release to the public letters that he had sent to the attorney
general requesting a decision under the Open Records Act.133 The attorney
general noted that it had never officially addressed the issue of how the Open
Records Act applies to request letters from governmental bodies.1 34 The
attorney general pointed out, however, that his office's practice had been to
make such letters generally available to the public.' 35 The attorney general
held that letters from governmental bodies requesting open records decisions
or arguing in support of the withholding of information under the Act are a
public record. 136 In order to ensure protection of information which is itself
the subject of the request or which raises a privacy issue, the attorney gen-
eral advised governmental bodies to submit that information in a separate
document accompanying their request letters.' 3 7
ORD-460. The city of Laredo received a request for the city manager's pro-
posed budget for a sewer fund. The city attorney claimed an exception
under section 3(a)(6) of the Open Records Act, which exempts drafts and
working papers used in the preparation of proposed legislation, and section
3(a)(1 1) of the Act, which exempts advice, opinion, and recommendations
concerning policy matters as an attempt to promote open discussion among
the entities' decision makers. Since the proposed budget in this instance was
merely a draft of legislation until the city council adopted it, the attorney
general held that the section 3(a)(6) exemption applied and did not address
the section 3(a)(1 1) issue.' 38
ORD-461. The El Paso Consultation Association, which worked with the El
Paso Independent School District on employee consultations, inquired
whether the Open Records Act required it to publicize a tape recording of
one of its monthly meetings. ' 39 The attorney general held that the Open
131. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 449-56, § 4.05(d) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
132. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-458 at 3.
133. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-459 (1987). TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(a),
§ 6(15) (Vernon Supp. 1988) provides that "information currently regarded by agency policy
as open to the public" is public information.
134. ORD-459 at 1.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2.
137. Id.
138. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-460 at 3 (1987).
139. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-461 (1987). The attorney general found that the tape was a
"developed material" per § 2(2) of the Act that contained official subject district business. Id.
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Records Act applies to tape recordings' 4° and that the consultation associa-
tion was a governmental body within the meaning of the Act because the
members of the association were school district employees. 14' According to
the attorney general, the association's obligation to release the tape turned
on whether its meeting was open to the public.1 42 The attorney general held
that if it was open to the public, the tape must be released. 143
ORD-462. This lengthy opinion dealt with whether the Act subjects to dis-
closure records prepared by a law firm employed by the University of Hous-
ton to investigate the school's football program. 44 The university
contended that the law firm was not a governmental body within the mean-
ing of the Act and, therefore, the Act was inapplicable. The attorney general
rejected the school's contention, however, finding that the information was
collected by someone acting on behalf of a governmental body.1 45 The attor-
ney general established a three-part test for determining whether the attor-
neys were subject to the Act. First the information gathered by the
consultant must relate to the governmental body's official business.146 Sec-
ond, the consultant must have acted as the governmental body's agent when
gathering the information. 14 7 Third, the governmental body must have ac-
cess to the information. 48 With certain exceptions, the attorney general or-
dered the documents to be released. 149
ORD-463. The state treasurer asked the attorney general to determine
whether the Act excepts from disclosure inventories of the contents of safety
deposit boxes subject to escheat by the state treasurer. 50 The state treasurer
argued that the information would give a competitive advantage to claimants
of unclaimed property. The attorney general held that the section 3(a)(4)
exception does not protect a governmental body's competitive advantage be-
cause a governmental body cannot be in competition with private enter-
prise. '5  The attorney general ordered release of the documents. 52
ORD-464. The attorney general held that section 3(a)(2) does not protect
from public disclosure evaluations of public university administrators made
by university faculty members unless the evaluations are highly intimate,
embarrassing, and of no legitimate interest to the public. 53 The attorney
general ruled that the public has an interest in the manner in which public
140. Id at 3.
141. Id.
142. Id at 5.
143. Id.
144. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-462 at 7 (1987).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 4.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 9-18.
150. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-463 (1987).
151. Id. at 2.
152. Id.
153. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-464 (1987).
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university administrators perform their official duties.1 54 In addition, the
attorney general held that section 3(a)(1 1) requires governmental bodies to
disclose anonymous evaluations consisting of statements requiring a stan-
dardized response.155 According to the attorney general, section 3(a)(l 1)
does not protect such information from disclosure.1 56
ORD-465. The Texas Department of Public Safety inquired whether the
Open Records Act required it to release copies of form letters notifying peo-
ple to appear for drivers' license suspension hearings.1 57 The attorney gen-
eral held that the letters were public information.15 8
ORD-466: Texas A&M requested an opinion as to whether section 3a(l 1) of
the Open Records Act exempted from disclosure the university's letters con-
cerning the granting of tenure to a probationary faculty member. The attor-
ney general permitted the university to withhold letters of recommendation
submitted by faculty at other universities about a probationary faculty mem-
ber at Texas A&M, evaluations from the faculty member's supervisors at
Texas A&M, a narrative summary and an evaluation of the letters of recom-
mendation and the evaluations, "tenure and promotion, worksheets and two
tenure committee reports." 159 The attorney general required the university,
however, to release that portion of the documents that was severable factual
information. 1 60
ORD-467. In this opinion the attorney general addressed the availability
under the Open Records Act of college transcripts of all school teachers and
administrators who had taken six or more semester hours since 1975. The
attorney general held that the Open Records Act does not protect from dis-
closure college transcripts and school district personnel files of those teach-
ers whom the school district employs. According to the attorney general,
school districts must release such records to the proper authorities.1 61
ORD-468. In this opinion the attorney general addressed the issue of
whether the city of Houston personnel department must release its files con-
cerning an individual's service as a city of Houston police officer from 1945
to 1964. The city sought to withhold evaluations of the officer's performance
and information regarding allegations of the officer's misconduct. The attor-
ney general held that the Open Records Act applies to information that gov-
ernmental bodies compiled before the effective date of the Act. The attorney
general did outline in his opinion, however, certain types of information that




157. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-465 (1987).
158. Id.
159. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-466 (1987).
160. Id.
161. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-467 (1987).
162. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-468 (1987).
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ORD-469. In this opinion the attorney general resolved whether the Open
Records Act protects documents concerning the athletic department of the
University of Texas. The University had previously turned over the docu-
ments in question to the Travis County district attorney in connection with
its on-going investigation into the university's activities. The attorney gen-
eral found that the Act's litigation exception did indeed protect the docu-
ments from disclosure.1 63
ORD-470. In this opinion the attorney general ruled on whether the Austin
Independent School District had to comply with a request for information
regarding the job performance of the principal of Crockett High School.
The attorney general found that the school district could, within its discre-
tion, release a major portion of the information although it was not required
to do so. 64
ORD-471. In this opinion the attorney general dealt with the availability of
Teacher Retirement System's records containing information such as the
teacher's last known employer, salary, position, experience, tenure, educa-
tion, home address, and home telephone number. The attorney general held
that such innocuous information did not fall under the Open Records Act's
exception for information involving a clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy and, therefore, should be released.165
ORD-472. In this opinion the attorney general addressed whether the Open
Records Act requires the Texas Department of Health to release department
investigation reports regarding the department's investigation of particular
complaints made against public entities. The attorney general held that the
information was protected as trade secrets and should, therefore, not be
released. 166
ORD-473. In this opinion the attorney general ruled on the Galveston city
attorney's failure to promptly request an Open Records Act opinion after
receiving a request for copies of performance appraisals of employees whom
the Galveston city council had appointed. The attorney general ordered the
city attorney to release the information in part because the city of Galveston
did not request the opinion until more than ten days had passed after receiv-
ing the request. The attorney general also held that in these instances the
city must show a compelling interest to overcome the Open Records Act's
presumption that the information is public.167
ORD-474. In this opinion the attorney general addressed the availability of
the Texas State Board of Pharmacy's documents and correspondence con-
taining allegations of misconduct against a licensed pharmacy and its
163. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-469 (1987).
164. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-470 (1987).
165. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-471 (1987).
166. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-472 (1987).
167. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-473 (1987).
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owner/pharmacist. The attorney general held that the pharmacy board in-
vestigative files are exempted from disclosure under article 4542a-1, section
17(q) of the Act. The attorney general went on to hold, however, that docu-
ments that the board sent to the pharmacist stating the nature of the com-
plaint and informing him that the board was considering disciplinary action
against him are not within the exception. 168
ORD-475. In this opinion the attorney general considered the availability of
the Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority's list of persons, includ-
ing their names, addresses, and telephone numbers, certified to be served by
the special transit system. The special transit system is available for persons
with disabilities that prevent them from using regular transit. The attorney
general held that the Open Records Act did not exempt from disclosure the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of applicants to the Capital Metro-
politan Transportation Authority for special transit systems. The attorney
general also ruled that no common law right of privacy protected the
information. 69
ORD-476. In this opinion the attorney general ruled on whether the Open
Records Act required the Texas Employment Commission to release the
names of employers or employees who filed unemployment benefit appeals.
The attorney general found that the Act's section 3a(1) exception applied
because federal regulations prohibit the Texas Employment Commission
from revealing the information.' 70
ORD-477. In this opinion the attorney general addressed whether the Open
Records Act requires the University of Texas, Texas A&M, and Texas Tech
to disclose the names of students whose degrees had been rescinded or sur-
rendered. The attorney general held that the Family Education and Rights
of Privacy Act prohibits an educational institution from disclosing the iden-
tities of persons whose degrees the institution had rescinded because of
events that occurred while those persons were students. The attorney gen-
eral was unable to reach a conclusion as to whether the Act protects the
identities of students who voluntarily surrendered their degrees because the
request did not contain sufficient factual information.1 71
ORD-478. In this opinion the attorney general considered whether the Open
Records Act requires the Texas Department of Public Safety to disclose
either information regarding the department's use of intoxilizer cards or the
logs that the department maintained. The attorney general held that the
department could withhold the information under the Act's law enforcement
exception, section 3a(8). The attorney general ruled, however, that the Act
protects the intoxilizer results relating to closed cases and, therefore, the
168. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-474 (1987).
169. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-475 (1987).
170. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-476 (1987).
171. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-477 (1987).
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department should withhold such information. Furthermore, the attorney
general ordered the department to release intoxilizer test results from the
subjects of those tests when the subjects themselves requested the results. 17 2
ORD-479. In this opinion the attorney general discussed whether the Open
Records Act protected copies of documents relating to Texaco's hydrologi-
cal work performed at its Headless Gas Processing Plant. Texaco had
marked the documents "confidential" and voluntarily submitted them to the
Texas Water Commission. The attorney general held that the information
was not confidential under the Open Records Act simply because Texaco
requested the water commission to keep the information confidential.
The attorney general notably rejected the notion that the voluntary nature
of Texaco's submission removed the documents from the scope of the Open
Records Act.' 73 The attorney general found that under section 3a(1 3), geo-
logical information that applicants file in connection with applications or
proceedings before a governmental agency is not protected from required
public disclosure. The attorney general ultimately, however, found that the
water commission could withhold the documents under section 3a(13) be-
cause Texaco did not file them with the Texas Water Commission in connec-
tion with an application or proceeding before the commission.
ORD-480. In this opinion the attorney general ruled on whether, under the
Open Records Act, the Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corporation
(TGSLC) must disclose the names of students who have received and de-
faulted on loans guaranteed by the TGSLC.' 74 The attorney general held
that the TGSLC is not an educational agency or institution that the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 protects. Consequently, the
attorney general held that the TGSLC should release the information.
C. Amendments to the Texas Open Records and Open Meetings Acts
The 70th Legislature made certain amendments to the Open Records and
Open Meetings Act. One of the most significant amendments to the Open
Records Act exempts from disclosure photographs that depict a peace officer
or a security officer, the release of which would endanger the life or physical
safety of the officer, unless the officer is under indictment, charged with an
offense, a party in a fire or a police civil service hearing or case in arbitration,
or the photograph is introduced as evidence in a judicial proceeding.17 5 The
70th Legislature also exempted from disclosure certain rare books, original
manuscripts, oral history interviews, personal papers, unpublished letters
and organizational records of nongovernmental entities.1 76 The legislature
also added an exemption for curriculum objectives and test items developed
172. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-478 (1987).
173. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-479 (1987).
174. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-480 (1987).




by educational institutions that are funded wholly, or in part, by state reve-
nues. 177 The legislature also added section 4A to the Act, which provides
that a person requesting public information must complete the examination
of the information within ten days after the date the custodian, of the infor-
mation makes it available. 178 The requesting party may, pursuant to the
Act, request an extension of time from the custodian, and the Act now re-
quires the custodian to extend the time for an additional ten days.
The most important of the 70th Legislature's changes to the Open Meet-
ings Act is the amendment to provide for the video recording of meetings
subject to the Act. In addition, the legislature amended the Open Meetings
Act to provide in section 2A that for each of its meetings that is closed to the
public, a governmental body must keep a certified agenda of its proceedings
or may make a tape recording of the proceedings, which must include the
presiding officer's announcement at the beginning and at the end of the meet-
ing indicating the date and time. 179 The governmental body must make the
certified agenda or tape available for in camera inspection by the judge of a
district court if litigation rises involving the governmental body's alleged vio-
lation of the Act. In addition, a governmental body is now required either to
prepare and retain minutes or to make a tape recording of each of its open
meetings pursuant to section 3B of the Act.18 0
II. ANNEXATION
In Central Education Agency v. Upshire County's Commissioners Court 181
the Texas Supreme Court reviewed a county commissioners court order de-
taching territory from one school district and annexing it to another. In July
of 1983, the Upshire County commissioners court was presented with a de-
tachment and annexation petition signed by a majority of the qualified voters
in a territory contiguous to Gilmer Independent School District (Gilmer
ISD). 8 2 The county commissioners court, sitting as a county board of edu-
cation, detached the territory from the Union Grove Independent School
District (Union Grove ISD) and annexed it to Gilmer ISD. The Union
Grove ISD appealed to the commissioner of education, who reversed the
order based upon its finding that the petitioners were motivated by the desire
to escape Union Grove's higher tax rate.' 8 3 The education commissioner
also found that the annexation would be unsound as a matter of educational
policy, and the state board affirmed. The petitioners sought judicial review
of the state board's action, and the trial court affirmed the state board, con-
cluding that the education commissioner and state board were not limited in
their review of the county commissioners court order to merely determine
177. Id.
178. Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 964, § 2, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 6593, 6594 (Vernon).
179. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 549, § 3, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4412, 4414 (Vernon).
180. Id. at 4416.
181. 731 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1987).




whether the petitioner satisfied statutory criteria for detachment. 8 4
The court of appeals reversed and held that the education commissioner
and state board had exceeded their statutory authority. The court of appeals
also held that the county commissioners were without authority to exercise
any discretion beyond determining whether the statutory criteria for detach-
ment and annexation had been met.185 Although affirming the court of ap-
peals, the Texas Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's reasoning
as to the discretion which the county commissioners could exercise in de-
tachment and annexation proceedings.' 8 6
The Texas Supreme Court wrote that the Texas Education Code "does
not create an automatic entitlement to detachment and annexation once the
statutory requirements are met, but merely provides the county commission-
ers with the authority to do so and states that they 'may' pass an order
transferring the territory."' 8 7 The critical issue to the appeal, according to
the supreme court, was what type of review the education commissioner
could exercise over the decision of the county officials.' 1 The commissioner
of education contended that he had broad discretion to conduct a de novo
review of the county commissioners' detachment and annexation decisions
and to consider factors other than the statutory criteria. The supreme court
rejected this interpretation of the statute, holding that "[in] hearing appeals
from county officials' detachment and annexation decisions, the Commis-
sioner is not to decide the issue or to substitute his own judgment for that of
the county officials."' 819
The decision, according to the supreme court, of whether to transfer
school district territory is discretionary with county commissioners subject
to the minimum requirements of section 19.261.190 The only type of de novo
hearing authorized before the education commissioner, according to the
court, is one "solely for the purpose of determining whether there was fraud,
bad faith or an abuse of discretion in the decision of the County Commis-
sioners and whether their decision is supported by substantial evidence."' 19
The decision was a narrow one as four judges dissented.
III. ELECTIONS
In Stevens v. McClure 192 a district judge voided an election for a county
justice of the peace. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of
jurisdiction when the appellant failed to timely file a bond, deposit cash, or
file an affidavit of inability to pay or secure costs. The appellant took the





188. Id. at 561.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 562.
192. 732 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ).
193. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 233.003(d) (Vernon 1986).
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an election contest. The Amarillo court of appeals rejected this position. 194
Subsequently, the winner of the voided election instituted a mandamus
action, Stevens v. Cane,195 seeking to determine whether the district court
was empowered to declare that the justice of the peace office was vacant.
The Amarillo court of appeals denied the writ on the basis that the district
court had not declared that the office of the justice of the peace was vacant
and that, in any event, no vacancy existed.196
Kelly v. Scott 197 involved an election contest, the outcome of which was
contingent on a late absentee ballot. The plaintiff initially won the contest,
but following a recount the decision was reversed by a vote of 191 to 190.
The trial court upheld the election finding that no illegal votes were
counted.198 The El Paso court of appeals reversed and remanded, however,
finding that a single late absentee ballot was void.199
The late absentee voter in question was hospitalized the night before the
election. 2°° The town clerk went to the hospital and remained outside the
room while the voter cast her ballot. The record did not disclose for whom
she voted, and no certificate accompanied the application for the late absen-
tee ballot. Texas Election Code section 102.002201 provides that a later ab-
sentee ballot must be accompanied by a certificate of a licensed physician,
chiropractor, or accredited Christian Science practitioner. The question on
appeal was whether this provision was mandatory or discretionary. The
court found the provision mandatory and invalidated the vote and the
election. 202
League of the United Latin American Citizens Council, No. 4386 v. Mid-
land Independent School District20 3 was a federal court action in which
black and Mexican American citizens alleged that the school district's at-
large system diluted their voting power in an election for the school district's
board of trustees. The trial court ordered the district to divide into seven
single member districts and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit upheld the decision over the dissent of Judge Patrick Higginbot-
ham.2°4 The appeal centered on whether black and hispanic voters were a
cohesive voting unit. The majority found that they were, but Judge Higgin-
botham argued that the district court finding that blacks and hispanics were
a single politically cohesive minority under Thornburg v. Gingles205 was
clearly erroneous. 20 6
194. 732 S.W.2d at 117.
195. 735 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1987, no writ).
196. Id. at 695-96.
197. 733 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ dism'd).
198. Id. at 313.
199. Id. at 314.
200. Id. at 313.
201. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 102.002 (Vernon 1986).
202. 733 S.W.2d at 313-14.
203. 812 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1987).
204. Id. at 1503.
205. 106 S. Ct. 2752, 92 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1986).
206. 812 F.2d at 1503.
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Martinez v. Slagle20 7 was a mandamus proceeding against the presiding
officer of the state democratic executive committee. The plaintiff sought to
compel Slagle to canvass the results of the initial recall conducted in a demo-
cratic primary run-off election for the nomination to the office of judge of the
293rd judicial district court. The writ also sought to compel Slagle to reject
the recount petition that the election's losing opponent submitted. The ini-
tial recount showed that Judge Martinez had won the run-off election,
although a second recount proved the opposite. The San Antonio court of
appeals held that the Election Code neither contemplates or permits a sec-
ond recount and granted the writ. 20 8
In Moore v. Barr209 an unsuccessful candidate for his party's nomination
for county commissioner filed suit contesting the results of the primary. The
trial court ruled against the candidate, and he appealed. The court of ap-
peals dismissed the appeal on the ground that when absentee balloting for
general election had begun, the issue was moot.210
Gandara v. Carrasco211 was another suit in which an unsuccessful candi-
date sought to challenge the results of the school board election. The trial
court dismissed the case for failure to serve the proper party. The decision
was reversed on appeal, with the El Paso court of appeals holding that the
successful candidate for the position was the proper person to serve to in-
voke the court's jurisdiction. 212
IV. TORT LIABILITY
The current Survey period includes a number of decisions in which courts
assessed both the validity of claims for damages resulting from governmental
conduct and the propriety and scope of governmental immunity. 21 3 This
section addresses decisions of courts considering the notice requirements for
claims against municipalities and governmental entities, the Texas Tort
Claims Act,214 and the federal cause of action for deprivation of civil
rights.215
A. Notice Requirements
The Texas Legislature authorized home rule cities to adopt rules gov-
erning their liability for damages for injuries to persons or property.21 6 Pur-
suant to this authority, many cities impose notice requirements upon
claimants suing municipalities for proprietary torts.217 Failure to observe
207. 717 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
208. Id. at 711.
209. 718 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
210. Id. at 926-27.
211. 718 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
212. Id. at 65.
213. For an outline of the scope of Texas governmental immunity, see Babcock & Collins,
Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 409, 452 (1981).
214. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.001-.109 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1988).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
216. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1175, § 6 (Vernon 1963).
217. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101 (Vernon 1986).
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notice requirements may foreclose any recovery. 218 In Borne v. City of Gar-
land,2 19 however, the Dallas court of appeals held that a thirty-day notice
provision in the Garland City Charter violated the open courts provision of
the Texas Constitution.220 In the trial court, the city obtained summary
judgment because the plaintiff failed to provide written notice of his claim
for personal injuries within thirty days as the city charter requires. The ap-
pellate court used a balancing test set out in Sax v. Votteler 22 1 in order to
determine whether the thirty-day notice requirement violated the open
courts provision. Noting that the notice provision did not contain any ex-
ception such as "good cause" or "actual notice," the court concluded that
the plaintiff's constitutionally-guaranteed right of redress outweighed the
legislative basis for the notice requirement.2 22 The court stated that the
thirty-day period serves only as a hindrance to plaintiffs' recovery for
wrongs done by government entities. 223 The court also relied upon two deci-
sions invalidating similar notice requirements of greater duration.224 The
concurring opinion, although recognizing that the Texas Supreme Court has
not yet addressed the applicability of an exception to notice requirements
under the Texas Tort Claims Act for cases in which the city has actual
notice of the injury or damage,225 concluded that a superintendent's report
of the accident raised a fact issue of "actual notice" to the city, thus preclud-
ing summary judgment. 226
Another court of appeals decision considering the actual notice exception
during the Survey period was Hill v. Bellville General Hospital.227 In Hill
the defendant, a "governmental entity" within the meaning of the Texas
Tort Claims Act, obtained a summary judgment in a negligence action be-
cause the plaintiffs failed to provide the hospital with notice of their claim
within six months of the occurrence, as required by the Texas Tort Claims
Act.22 8 The court of appeals noted that the hospital investigated the inci-
dent and did not dispute that it knew the time, manner, and place of the
218. LaBove v. City of Groves, 602 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont) (advi-
sory letter to city that did not conform to notice requirements did not constitute notice), writ
ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 608 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1980); Bowling v. City of Port Arthur, 522
S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (filing notice with city
manager instead of city commission as required did not constitute notice).
219. 718 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
220. Id. at 25. The open courts provision of the Texas Constitution is TEX. CONsT. art. I,
§ 13.
221. 648 S.W.2d 661, 665-66 (Tex. 1983).
222. 718 S.W.2d at 24.
223. Id. at 25 (citing Artco-Bell Corp. v. City of Temple, 616 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex.
1981)).
224. Schautteet v. City of San Antonio, 702 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985),
writ ref'd per curiam, 706 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1986) (ninety days); Fitts v. City of Beaumont,
688 S.W.2d 1982 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (sixty days).
225. Borne v. City of Garland, 718 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (dis-
cussing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(c) (Vernon 1986) and City of Houston v.
Torres, 621 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1981)).
226. 718 S.W.2d at 25.
227. 735 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1987, no writ).
228. Id. at 676.
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incident giving rise to the plaintiffs' claim. 229 The court concluded that the
evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact whether the Hospital had
'factual notice" of the plaintiffs' injury and reversed the summary
judgment.23 0
B. Liability under 42 U.S. C. Section 1983
In Rosow v. City of San Antonio2 31 the Texas Supreme Court declined to
construe a "classified" civil service employee's wrongful termination claim
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871232 as an appeal from an administrative
action. 23 3 After the city of San Antonio terminated the plaintiff for her al-
leged incompetency, discourtesy to fellow employees, and conduct prejudi-
cial to good order, the plaintiff appealed to the Municipal Civil Services
Commission which unanimously recommended her reinstatement and re-
quested a conference with the city manager. The city manager refused this
request, disregarded the commission's recommendation, and terminated the
plaintiff. Finding that the city's termination of the plaintiff was arbitrary
and capricious, the jury awarded the plaintiff $150,000 in damages, rein-
statement, and attorneys' fees. The court of appeals, characterizing the
plaintiff's claim as an appeal from an administrative action that is review-
able under the substantial evidence rule,2 34 found that substantial evidence
existed to support the city manager's termination decision.23 5 Accordingly,
it reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered that the plaintiff take
nothing. 23 6 In reversing the judgment of the court of appeals and affirming
the judgment of the trial court, the supreme court noted that the court of
appeals improperly classified the plaintiff's cause of action as an appeal from
an administrative action and determined that the pleadings, evidence, issues,
and instructions clearly set forth a section 1983 claim. 237 The court distin-
guished Martine v. Board of Regents, 23 a case in which the plaintiff sought
reinstatement to his former job instead of damages and in which the section
1983 claim was, by counsel's own admission, a hastily-added alternate cause
229. Id. at 677.
230. Id. at 677-78.
231. 734 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1021 (1988).
232. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
233. 734 S.W.2d at 659.
234. City of San Antonio v. Rosow, 716 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1986); see supra note 231 and accompanying text.
235. Id. at 639-40.
236. Id. The court of appeals recognized that the city did not object to the submission of
the due process issue, but noted that "the jury's finding on such an issue was immaterial and
cannot, as a matter of law, be the basis of a judgment." Id. at 637.
237. Rosow v. City of San Antonio, 734 S.W.2d 659, 660-61 (Tex. 1987).
238. 578 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979), appeal after remand, 607 S.W.2d 638




During the Survey period, two Fifth Circuit decisions examined whether a
court can hold a county jointly and severally liable for a back-pay judgment
and whether injuries received during violence on a school bus may result in
section 1983 liability. In Barrett v. Thomas24° Dallas County appealed an
order of the district court holding it jointly and severally liable for a back-
pay award to the plaintiff entered against Thomas, a former sheriff of Dallas
County.241 In holding that the court may hold the county jointly and sever-
ally liable for the back-pay award, the Fifth Circuit relied upon Brandon v.
Holt 2 4 2 and Kentucky v. Graham,243 two decisions in which the United
States Supreme Court held that if a plaintiff sues a government employee in
his official capacity, the local government that has adequate notice of the suit
and an opportunity to respond may be liable even though it is not a party to
the suit.244 The Fifth Circuit then concluded that its prior holding in Barrett
1245 and the law of the case doctrine required the conclusion that Barrett
sued Thomas in his official capacity and that the county had the opportunity
to intervene in the suit but failed to timely do S0.246
After the Barrett I decision, but before the district court modified its rul-
ing to hold the county jointly and severally liable for the back-pay award,
Barrett filed a separate section 1983 suit against the county for failure to pay
the tort judgment. The district court dismissed that suit because no out-
standing judgment against the county then existed and awarded attorneys'
fees to the county as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. section 1988. On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Barrett's
section 1983 suit;247 however, it reversed the attorneys' fee award, noting
that the nonparty county's liability under section 1983 was unclear at the
time of the Barrett I decision and that Barrett's claim was not frivolous be-
cause Barrett I may have implied that the county was liable for the back-pay
award. 248 The court also specifically declined to address whether Barrett's
claim for failure to pay a tort judgment would be cognizable pursuant to
section 1983 had there been a prior judgment against the county.249
239. 578 S.W.2d at 474. In his concurring opinion in Rosow, Justice Spears cautioned that
the majority should not be read as a signal that every terminated municipal employee has a
§ 1983 cause of action. Rosow v. City of San Antonio, 734 S.W.2d at 661.
240. 809 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1987).
241. The district court's order was a modification of a judgment rendered in a prior deci-
sion that was affirmed in part and reversed in part by the Fifth Circuit in Barrett v. Thomas,
649 F.2d 1193, 1202 (5th Cir. 1981) (Barrett I). In Barrett I the court affirmed the decision
holding Thomas individually liable for his politically-motivated demotion of Barrett, but re-
versed the imposition of attorneys' fees against Thomas alone and rendered judgment holding
the county jointly and severally liable for attorneys' fees. Id.
242. 469 U.S. 464 (1985).
243. 473 U.S. 159 (1985).
244. 809 F.2d at 1155.
245. See supra note 241.
246. Barrett v. Thomas, 809 F.2d at 1155.
247. Id. at 1156.
248. Id.
249. 809 F.2d at 1156 n.4. Similarly, the court declined to address the correctness of Evans
v. City of Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1982), which holds that a failure to pay a tort
judgment may support a § 1983 claim. 809 F.2d at 1155.
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In Lopez v. Houston Independent School District, 250 an action stemming
from injuries a child received during a fight on a school bus, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed a summary judgment dismissing section 1983 claims against the
Houston Independent School District (HISD) and two supervisors, but re-
versed a summary judgment dismissing a section 1983 claim against the bus
driver.25' With respect to HISD the court noted that it could not hold the
school district liable unless its policy or custom was the impetus for the vio-
lation of the child's civil rights.252 The court then responded to Lopez's
argument that HISD's training was inadequate or, in the alternative, that the
bus driver ignored his training. Both arguments failed, according to the
court, because no summary judgment evidence established that the fight on
the bus was anything other than an episodic event.253 The court concluded,
therefore, that HISD enacted no policy of nonprotection or inadequate train-
ing rising to the level of reckless disregard for the rights of the students.254
With respect to the bus driver, however, the court noted that the plaintiff's
complaint, read liberally, alleged that the bus driver acted in callous disre-
gard of the child's constitutional rights,255 and the court therefore concluded
that the failure of the bus driver to protect the child or to render certain
emergency aid may constitute an abuse of state power and may support a
section 1983 claim if the bus driver's failure not only reached the level of
gross negligence but also caused the injury.256
In Bagg v. University of Texas Medical Branch, 257 a wrongful termination
action, a Texas court of appeals reviewed a trial court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's section 1983 claims based on governmental immunity. After de-
termining that the state was immune from suit, the court addressed a novel
issue in Texas: the extent of governmental immunity from suits based on
section 1983.258 In resolving the issue, the court examined decisions of sev-
eral other states and concluded that even though 42 U.S.C. section 1983
creates a constitutional tort, the states have power to decide whether or not
to open their courts to plaintiffs bringing such claims. 259 On appeal, how-
ever, the court of appeals reversed the district court's summary judgment in
250. 817 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1987).
251. Id. at 356.
252. Id. at 354 (citing Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1987),
and quoting Mondell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
253. 817 F.2d 351, 354-55 (5th Cir. 1987). The court cited Thibodeaux v. Arceneaux, 768
F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1985), for the proposition that HISD was not liable under § 1983 for
an employee's one-time violation of its safety procedures. 817 F.2d at 354.
254. 817 F.2d at 354. The court also cited Thibodeaux v. Arceneaux, 768 F.2d 737, 739
(5th Cir. 1985), for the proposition that the school district "could not be held liable under
§ 1983 for an episodic violation of its safety instructions." 817 F.2d at 354.
255. 817 F.2d at 355. The court held that such a factual allegation states a claim of consti-
tutional deprivation under § 1983. Id. (citing Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th
Cir. 1986)).
256. Id. at 356.
257. 726 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, ref'd writ n.r.e.).
258. Id. at 585-86. The court noted that the question was novel "because most civil rights
actions have been brought in federal courts, where the state is protected by the 1 th Amend-




favor of the individual defendants.26° The appellate court noted that the
district court based its summary judgments upon the defendants' qualified
good faith immunity that exists in the absence of an allegation that they
violated generally known statutory or constitutional rights.261 Although the
court of appeals recognized that the plaintiff failed to specifically allege such
a violation as required by federal practice, the court applied Texas Rules of
Procedure and concluded that the proper procedure was to outline the fail-
ure in specific special exceptions. If the court subsequently grants the special
exceptions and the plaintiff fails to adequately amend, then a court should
dismiss his suit. 26
2
C. Liability Under Texas Tort Claims Act
In a case of first impression, the Texas Supreme Court significantly ex-
panded the potential liability of municipalities by holding that, in certain
circumstances, a municipality may be subject to exemplary damages. In City
of Gladewater v. Pike263 the relatives of a deceased boy sought actual and
exemplary damages for the alleged negligence of the city in its misplacement
of the boy's body, which had been buried in a municipal cemetery. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment based upon a jury finding
that the city was grossly negligent in failing to keep records and that the
city's negligence proximately caused the loss of the boy's body. The
supreme court affirmed the holding of the court of appeals that a municipal-
ity may be liable for exemplary damages, but determined that the city's con-
duct did not warrant exemplary damages. 264 In arriving at its decision, the
court examined the decisions of numerous jurisdictions that either deny ex-
emplary damages as a matter of law,265 allow exemplary damages under the
same circumstances as with corporations, 266 or allow exemplary damages
based upon the facts of each case. 267 The court then examined numerous
court of appeals' decisions and synthesized a two-prong test for imposing
exemplary damages against municipalities.
The first prong, culpability of the municipal agent, requires that the mu-
260. Id. at 587.
261. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
262. Id.
263. 727 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. 1987).
264. Id. at 524. Before reaching the exemplary damages issue, the court noted that
although the Texas Tort Claims Act does not authorize exemplary damages, the Act does not
apply when a municipality acts in a proprietary, rather than a governmental capacity. Id. at
519. Even though no Texas court has ruled whether the operation of a cemetery is a proprie-
tary function, the court noted that eight other jurisdictions had concluded that such operation
was a proprietary function. Id.
265. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981); Gonzalez v. City of
Peoria, 537 F. Supp. 793, 797 (D. Ariz. 1982); City of Columbus v. Myszka, 272 S.E.2d 302,
305 (Ga. 1980); Urban Renewal Agency v. Tackett, 255 So. 2d 904, 905 (Miss. 1971).
266. Henningan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667, 683 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Dickerson v.
Young, 322 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Iowa 1983); Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 622
(Iowa 1978); Rannels v. City of Cleveland, 321 N.E.2d 885, 887-89 (Ohio 1975).
267. Jackson v. Davis, 530 F. Supp. 2, 5 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); Holda v. County of Cane, 410
N.E.2d 552, 563 (Ill. App. 1980); Adams v. Salina, 48 P. 918, 919 (Kan. 1897).
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nicipality have acted with some culpability greater than gross negligence. 268
The court agreed with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Peace v. City of
Center269 that a plaintiff must plead and prove that the agent acted with
malice, evil intent, or gross negligence or its equivalent.270 The second
prong, attributing the agent's liability back to the municipality, requires that
the municipality expressly have authorized the agent's acts, that the agent
have committed the acts pursuant to an official policy, or that an official
authorized to make policy personally have committed the act.271
Applying its new two-pronged test to the facts before it in City of Glade-
water, the supreme court concluded that no evidence indicating malice or
evil intent on the part of the city officials existed and that, at best, plaintiffs
proved indifference on the part of the officials involved.2 72 Accordingly, the
court reversed the holdings of the trial court and the court of appeals that
plaintiffs were entitled to exemplary damages.273
The Texas courts of appeals rendered several decisions of note during the
Survey period construing the Texas Tort Claims Act. In two decisions, Bry-
ant v. Metropolitan Transit Authority274 and Heyer v. Northeast Independent
School District,275 the courts of appeals interpreted the scope of the Tort
Claims Act provisions waiving governmental immunity.276 In Bryant a bus
passenger sought damages from the defendant transit authority 277 for inju-
ries he sustained when he was assaulted by other passengers on the defend-
ant's bus. Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, a governmental unit has no
immunity for damage it causes through the operation of motor vehicles and
property.2 78 Nevertheless, in Bryant the court of appeals, over a forceful
dissent, interpreted the Act to mean that no immunity exists if a governmen-
tal unit causes damage through its operation of motor vehicles or prop-
erty.279 The court believed that the legislature, in codifying the limited
immunity, did not intend to alter the meaning or scope of the Texas Tort
Claims Act.280 In support of its holding the Bryant court cited section 1.001
of the Act, in which the legislature stipulates that it intended its revision of
268. 727 S.W.2d at 522-23. The usual test for gross negligence is the one set out by the
supreme court in Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex. 1981).
269. 372 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1967).
270. 727 S.W.2d at 523 (approving Peace, 372 F.2d at 650).
271. City of Gladewater v. Pike, 727 S.W.2d 514, 523 (Tex. 1987) (citing Thomas v. Sams,
734 F.2d 185, 192 (5th Cir. 1984)).
272. Id. at 524.
273. Id. at 525. The supreme court recognized that the avowed purposes of exemplary
damages may have no place in the context of municipalities and that certain policy arguments
favor the denial of exemplary damages in these cases. The court noted, nevertheless, that "any
exception to be carved out of the general rule of non-liability must create an exceedingly diffi-
cult burden to meet." Id. at 524 (emphasis in original).
274. 722 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
275. 730 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
276. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1986).
277. A transit authority qualifies as a local government entity by virtue of TEX. REV. CiV.
STAT. ANN. art. 11 18x, § 13A (Vernon Supp. 1988), and, therefore, is subject to the provisions
of the Texas Tort Claims Act.
278. Id.




the Act adding the immunity limitation to effect no substantive change.281
Accordingly, the court concluded that the word "and" in section
101.021(l)(B) of the Texas Tort Claims Act means "or" and, therefore, re-
versed the summary judgment in favor of the defendant transit authority.282
In Heyer 283 a high school student who was waiting to board her school
bus was injured in the school parking lot when a fellow student's car acceler-
ated out of control. Appealing the trial court's summary judgment in favor
of the school district, the plaintiff argued that the school district waived its
governmental immunity by operating the school bus. The court of appeals
stated that the plaintiff had to show that the officer's negligent or wrongful
use of the governmental unit's motor vehicle proximately caused her inju-
ries. 284 In so holding, the court relied upon the common definition of the
word "use" and upon the holding in Jackson v. City of Corpus Christi285 that
the Texas Tort Claims Act requires that the governmental officer's negli-
gence arise from the operation or use of the vehicle involved. 286 The court
then concluded that no facts supported a finding that any causal connection
existed between the plaintiff's injuries and the school district's operation of
the bus.28 7 Accordingly, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor
of the school district.288
Two courts of appeals considered whether a police officer's failure to per-
form certain duties entitles a claimant to recover for his injuries. In Dent v.
City of Dallas28 9 the decedent's spouse and parents brought an action
against police officers and the city for damages caused when a motorist flee-
ing from the police officers crashed into the decedent's car. The plaintiffs
alleged that the officer's failure to arrest the motorist immediately after pull-
ing him over constituted negligence and obtained a judgment against the city
and one of the officers. On appeal on that theory, the court of appeals held
that the police officer was a nonjudicial government official who performed
his discretionary function in good faith.29° Consequently, the appellate
court reversed the trial court and rendered a take nothing judgment against
the plaintiffs. 29' Whether a police officer owes a duty to a third party in-
jured by a person whom the officer had probable cause to arrest, but did not,
was a question of first impression in Texas. After reviewing decisions of
other jurisdictions holding that an officer owes no duty to specific individu-
als, the court concluded that Texas officers do not owe a specific duty.292
281. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 1.001 (Vernon 1986).
282. Bryant, 722 S.W.2d at 741.
283. Heyer v. North East Indep. School Dist., 730 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
284. Id. at 131.
285. 484 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
286. Id. at 810.
287. Heyer, 730 S.W.2d at 132.
288. Id. at 133.
289. 729 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
290. Id. at 117.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 116. The court also held, as a matter of law, that the sole proximate cause of the
accident was the grossly negligent conduct of the individual fleeing from the officer and stated
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In a somewhat similar case, Munoz v. Cameron County,2 9 3 a murder vic-
tim's children brought an action against the county and the county sheriff
alleging that their negligence in failing to timely execute an arrest warrant
upon an individual, who subsequently shot the plaintiffs' mother, was the
proximate cause of the mother's death. The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's summary judgment for the county because the plaintiffs' failed
to allege or to prove facts establishing the county's waiver of its immunity
under the Texas Tort Claims Act.294 The court of appeals also affirmed the
summary judgment in favor of the sheriff.29 5 In doing so, the court noted
that no cause of action for failure to execute a warrant exists at common law
or by statute. 296 The court also considered whether a sheriff's duty to exe-
cute an arrest warrant 297 extends to specific people or to the general public.
Relying upon South v. Maryland,298 the court concluded that a sheriff's duty
runs to the general public and not to a specific individual. 299 Nevertheless,
the court did recognize an exception to this rule of nonliability when a spe-
cial relationship exists between the victim and the agency or officer. 3°° In
the Munoz case, however, the court concluded that no evidence of such a
special relationship existed.301
During the Survey period, several courts of appeals examined the issue of
governmental immunity in the context of city water treatment and sewer
operations. In Parr Golf, Inc. v. City of Cedar Hill 302 the plaintiff brought
an action against the city alleging he suffered emotional distress when he saw
and smelled the raw sewage that backed up onto his property from a clogged
city sewer. In reviewing a summary judgment in favor of the city based on
its sovereign immunity, the court noted that operating and maintaining a
sanitary sewer is a governmental function. 303 The court also examined the
code section providing a waiver of governmental immunity for personal in-
jury and death caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real
property if a private person would be liable under Texas law. 3° 4 The court
then concluded that the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the city
was improper because the city's operation and maintenance of the sewer is a
use of tangible property and because the plaintiff's deposition testimony es-
tablished an issue of fact as to whether he suffered an injury (nausea) when
he discovered the raw sewage on his property. 30 5 The court held that some
that police officers are not the insurers for the conduct of the suspects they pursue. Id. at 116-
17.
293. 725 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
294. Id. at 320.
295. Id. at 323.
296. Id. at 321.
297. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.01 (Vernon 1977).
298. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855).
299. Munoz v. Cameron County, 725 S.W.2d at 322.
300. Id. at 322 (citing Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956)).
301. Id.
302. 718 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
303. Id. at 47.
304. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1986)).
305. Id. at 47-48.
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evidence of physical injury existed, and thus the court did not address
whether the recent supreme court decision in Moore v. Lillebo306 applies in
the context of a negligence action.307
In a similar case, Brown & Root, Inc. v. City of Cities Municipal Utility
District,308 the utility district obtained a summary judgment on grounds of
sovereign immunity against homeowners who alleged mental distress due to
the sunken condition of their homes. The homeowners claimed that their
homes subsided as a result of the utility district's allegedly negligent design
and installation of a drainage culvert. In determining whether the district's
conduct fell within the waiver provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act, the
court of appeals found that the manner in which the utility district designed,
installed, and used the culvert satisfied the waiver of immunity requirement
that the utility district's use of the property contributed to the injury.30 9 The
court then turned to the question of whether the plaintiffs' allegations of
mental distress qualified as personal injuries within the meaning of the Texas
Tort Claims Act. The court noted that the general rule requires proof of
physical injury resulting from the alleged mental anguish. 310 After examin-
ing several cases noted in Moore v. Lillebo,31 1 the court stated that certain
torts inherently cause mental anguish and that when such a tort is involved,
courts need not require proof of physical injury.312 The court then con-
cluded that the plaintiffs' allegations raised the issue of mental anguish and,
in this context, satisfied the personal injury requirement of the exception to
immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act.313 Accordingly, the court re-
versed the summary judgment in favor of the utility district. 314
Claimants alleging that a city's operation of a water treatment and sewage
plant, or of a sewer system, resulted only in damage to property, however,
have not been able to rely upon the exception to the city's immunity pro-
vided by the Texas Tort Claims Act. Rather, courts limit such claimants to
allegations of a "taking" of property in contravention of the Texas Constitu-
tion.315 In Abbott v. City of Kaufman 316 landowners sought to recover for
damage to their property caused by flooding of water which the city dis-
charged from its sewage treatment plant. Noting that Texas, unlike most
states, characterizes a city's construction and operation of a sanitary sewer
system as a governmental function, the court concluded that the landowners'
claim for property damage did not fall within an exception to governmental
306. 722 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. 1986) (proof of physical injury need not be shown to recover for
mental anguish suffered by wrongful death beneficiaries).
307. 718 S.W.2d at 48.
308. 721 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
309. Id. at 884 (citing Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. 1983)).
310. Id.
311. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 513, 514 (July 12, 1986).
312. 721 S.W.2d at 885.
313. Id
314. Id.
315. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17 provides: "No person's property shall be taken, damaged or
destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made unless by
consent of such person."
316. 717 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ dism'd).
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immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act.317 Nevertheless, the court re-
versed a summary judgment in favor of the city because the landowners had
alleged a cause of action for the taking of their property resulting from the
construction of a public improvement compensable under the Texas
Constitution. 3 18
In City of Abilene v. Smithwick 319 the court addressed a similar claim by
landowners for damage to their property due to sewer backups. In reversing
a jury verdict in favor of landowners, the court of appeals noted that to
recover for a taking under article I, section 17, of the Texas Constitution, the
landowners had to prove the city acted intentionally. 320 The court then re-
viewed the evidence, found no evidence that the city intentionally took the
landowners' property for public use, and rendered judgment that landowners
take nothing. 321
V. OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
During the Survey period, both Texas and federal courts considered nu-
merous issues involving officers and employees of local governments and
governmental divisions. The cases discussed in this section address due pro-
cess and administrative issues in connection with a government's termina-
tion or suspension of its employees, the constitutionality of a government's
abolition of its justice of the peace positions, the applicability of mandamus
actions relating to government employees, and a governmental officer's or
employee's immunity from tort liability.
A. Termination and Indefinite Suspension of Employees
Federal courts addressed constitutional challenges to a university's termi-
nation of a truck-driving instructor in one decision and a school district's
nonrenewal of a contract of a probationary teacher in another decision. In
Yates v. Board of Regents322 a district court denied a university's motion for
partial summary judgment and concluded that fact issues existed concerning
whether the plaintiff had a property interest in continued employment and
whether the university allowed her due process before firing her.3 2 3 The
plaintiff was hired as a truck-driving instructor at the university and the
university thereafter renewed her appointment on two separate occasions.
Although at the last renewal both parties expected her employment to con-
tinue for approximately ten months, her supervisors sent her numerous let-
ters indicating deficiencies in her performance. The plaintiff then resigned
and brought an action alleging that the university constructively discharged
her in violation of her due process rights. Addressing whether the plaintiff
held any property interest in continued employment, the district court noted
317. Id. at 930.
318. Id. at 933.
319. 721 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
320. Id. at 951.
321. Id. at 952-53.
322. 654 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
323. Id. at 981-82.
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that such an interest, as created and defined by state law, may be contained
either in an employment agreement or in a state statute, rule, or regula-
tion.324 Notwithstanding the absence of an express employment contract or
Texas courts' adherence to the employment-at-will doctrine, the court con-
cluded that it could not rule, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff had no
property interest in her continued employment since she produced some evi-
dence of a university practice requiring cause for dismissal of nonprobation-
ary employees. 325 The court also declined to rule, as a matter of law, that
pre-termination written notices of the university's perceived concerns com-
plied with due process requirements. 326 The court noted that the existence
of a genuine issue of fact as to whether the university's written notices al-
lowed the plaintiff an opportunity to respond to the supervisor's com-
plaints. 327 The court also pointed to evidence that university officials never
told the plaintiff of her right to a grievance hearing as provided in the univer-
sity's personnel handbook. 32 8
In Montgomery v. Trinity Independent School District 329 the plaintiff, a
probationary teacher, alleged that the school district based its decision not to
renew her contract on her constitutionally protected activities as president of
the Texas State Teachers Association. The court adopted the following test
for determining whether a school district's termination of an employee con-
flicts with the employee's exercise of his or her constitutionally protected
first amendment rights: initially, the employee must show that his or her
constitutionally protected behavior was a factor in the school district's deci-
sion to terminate the employee. If the employee successfully links his or her
termination to his or her exercise of first amendment rights, then the em-
ployer must demonstrate that its termination decision was not based on the
employee's constitutionally protected conduct. 330 The court faulted the fact
that the plaintiff did not offer evidence of any specific first amendment activi-
ties, either in her public capacity or in her capacity with the Texas State
Teachers Association, and thus affirmed the trial court's directed verdict for
the district, reiterating that, absent first amendment protections, a nonten-
ured teacher has no constitutional right to demand that a school district
explain the basis for his or her termination.3 3 1 The court also relied upon
324. Id. at 981 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 351 (1976)). The court also noted that,
absent a contract term to the contrary, Texas employers and employees may terminate their
relationship at any time without cause. Id. at 981 (citing Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644
S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ)). The court also noted that em-
ployee handbooks standing alone do not create contractual rights regarding termination proce-
dures. Id. at 981 (citing Vallone v. Agip, 705 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 982. The court stated that the employee must have written notice of the reasons
for termination and an opportunity to respond to those reasons prior to termination. Id. at
981-82 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. 809 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1987).
330. Id. at 1061 (citing Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 287 (1977)).
331. Id. at 1061 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)).
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the lack of any evidence indicating that the board or any board member
acted in retaliation for plaintiff's alleged activities or views.332 The court
also noted that, even though the board deviated from its standard practice in
making nonrenewal decisions, its deviation did not constitute evidence of the
school district's retaliation or of its impermissibly unfair treatment. 333 Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that no conflicting substantial evidence cre-
ated a jury question and, therefore, affirmed the trial court's ruling.334
In Plaster v. City of Houston 335 a Houston police officer sought review of
an order of the Houston Civil Service Commission upholding his indefinite
suspension. The suspension stemmed from the officer's refusal to obey an
order from the police chief requiring the officer to answer questions and to
make a written statement in connection with a department investigation of
his use of a throw-down gun. On appeal, the officer argued that the order
was unlawful and that the police chief and the commission improperly con-
sidered the use of the throw-down gun, which occurred more than six
months prior to the suspension. 336 Challenging the legality of the police
chief's order, the officer relied upon the order's statement that the depart-
ment could not use any information or evidence that it gained in its investi-
gation against him in any criminal proceeding. The officer asserted that the
statement was incorrect and thus made the order illegal since his statement
subsequently could be used to impeach him. The court concluded, however,
that the order was accurate, and thus lawful, since any statement by the
officer would have been involuntary and, therefore, not usable for any pur-
pose, including impeachment, in a criminal trial.337
The court also rejected the officer's second assertion that the police chief
and the commission improperly considered actions that occurred more than
six months prior to the date of suspension.338 Although the throw-down
gun incident occurred three years before the suspension, the acts that the
police chief complained of related not to that incident, but to the officer's
refusal to obey the lawful order that occurred less than six months prior to
the date of suspension. The court stated that the chief of police may use acts
and events outside the six-month period to explain and evaluate acts within
the six-month period. 339 Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of
332. Id.
333. Ma
334. Id. at 1062.
335. 721 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
336. TEX. REV, CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 26 (repealed), states:
Indefinite Suspensions...
." [N]o act or acts may be complained of by said [chief of police] which did not
happen or occur within six (6) months immediately preceding the date of sus-
pension ....
Id.
337. 721 S.W.2d at 423 (citations omitted).
338. Id.; see supra note 336.
339. 721 S.W.2d at 423 (citing Vick v. City of Waco, 614 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Houston v. Dillon, 596 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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the trial court upholding the officer's indefinite suspension. 34
In Burke v. Central Education Agency341 the plaintiff sought judicial re-
view of a school district's nonrenewal of his contract. His administrative
appeals of the school district's action concluded with the state board of edu-
cation's denial of his motion for rehearing. The court of appeals considered
whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment against the
plaintiff because his motion for rehearing before the state board of education
lacked sufficient particularity to comply with section 16(e) of the Adminis-
trative Procedure and Texas Register Act (APTRA).342 Prior to examining
Burke's motion for rehearing, the court recognized that APTRA section
16(e) is silent concerning specificity.343 Nevertheless, relying upon Subur-
ban Utility Corp. v. Public Utility Commission,344 the court of appeals con-
cluded that ATPRA section 16(e) requires that a complaining party must, in
his motion for rehearing assert the following two elements regarding each
point of error: first, the agency's specific action that he or she asserts was
error; and, secondly, the legal foundation of such assertion.3 45 Reviewing
the plaintiff's motion for rehearing, 346 the court found that each point was
insufficient to inform the agency of the error claimed or asserted. 347 In addi-
tion, the court concluded that the plaintiff's adoption by reference of the
entire administrative record did not satisfy the requirements of section 16(e)
because it burdened the agency with the onus of uncovering its own mistakes
and correcting them.348 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment against the plaintiff.3 49
B. Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service Act
In Firefighters' and Police Officers' Civil Service Commission v. Ceazer350
the court reviewed an action in which a firefighter sought and obtained a
writ of mandamus compelling the Firefighters' and Police Officers' Civil Ser-
vice Commission to reinstate him.3 5 In its appeal, the commission argued
340. Id.
341. 725 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
342. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp. 1988). The court of appeals
previously had reviewed the judgment and concluded that the pleading requirement for rehear-
ing motions contained in the APTRA could not be reconciled with, and gave controlling effect
to, the analogous provisions of the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§§ 21.201-.211 (Vernon Supp. 1988). Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the summary
judgment against the teacher. Burke v. Central Educ. Agency, 701 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1985). The Texas Supreme Court, however, reversed that decision and re-
manded the action to the court of appeals to determine if the teacher's motion for rehearing
was sufficiently specific to constitute compliance with APTRA § 16(e). Central Educ. Agency
v. Burke, 711 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. 1986).
343. 725 S.W.2d at 396.
344. 652 S.W.2d 358, 365 (Tex. 1983).
345. 725 S.W.2d at 397.
346. To examine the six points raised in Burke's motion for rehearing, see id. at 398.
347. Id. at 398-99.
348. Id. at 399.
349. Id.
350. 725 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
351. The trial court granted the writ of mandamus compelling reinstatement because the
commission failed to hold a hearing within thirty days of the firefighter's notice of appeal. See
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that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the firefighter failed, as a mat-
ter of law, to invoke the commission's jurisdiction. The court recognized
that unless the firefighter properly invoked the jurisdiction of the commis-
sion, the trial court lacked jurisdiction.352 The court also recognized that a
firefighter must file his appeal to the commission within ten days of the ac-
tion of which he complains and that such appeal must contain a denial of the
charge, an exception to the legal sufficiency of the charge, an allegation that
the recommended action is in excess of the alleged offense, any combination
of the foregoing, and a request for a commission hearing. 353 Although the
firefighter timely filed his notice of appeal, the notice failed to include any of
the requisites. The court concluded, therefore, that in the absence of juris-
diction, the commission did not have to hold a hearing within thirty days or
reinstate the firefighter. 354
C. Mandamus Actions
In Smith v. Flack 355 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held, in part,
that court-appointed criminal defense attorneys were entitled to a writ of
mandamus compelling the county auditor, acting pursuant to his statutory
authority, to pay attorneys' fees awarded by a district court judge.356 In
Smith the district court judge awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff's attor-
ney for prosecuting an appeal. When the plaintiff presented his claim to the
county auditor, however, he discovered that the Board of Judges Trying
Criminal Cases in Harris County amended their local rules to establish a fee
schedule for court-appointed attorneys with minimum and maximum fees
for each category provided in article 26.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. 357 The county auditor transferred the matter to the board of
judges, who denied the plaintiff's claim and approved a reduced amount.
In Smith the majority recognized that a court may only issue a writ of
mandamus when the plaintiff seeks to compel a ministerial act, or a duty
which the law requires the officer to perform. 358 In enacting article 26.05 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, which unambiguously authorizes a county
to pay fees to court-appointed attorneys, the legislature set minimum fees,
but specifically avoided setting maximum limits on attorneys' fees. 359 Re-
viewing the duty of the county auditor, the court noted that the Texas Legis-
lature requires a county auditor to examine and approve each claim or bill
TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m (repealed and codified as TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 143.010 (Vernon Pam. 1988)).
352. 725 S.W.2d at 433.
353. Id. (quoting TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 17 (repealed and codified as
TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 143.010 (Vernon Pam. 1988)).
354. Id. at 433. The court also relied upon City of Plano Firefighters' and Police Officers'
Civil Service Commission v. Maxam, 685 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), and concluded that Maxam was indistinguishable from this action. Id
355. 728 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
356. Id. at 794. The requirement that appointed criminal counsel must be paid by the
county is set out in TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 26.05, § l(a), (e) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
357. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 26.05 (Vernon 1966).




that the county contemplates paying. 36° The court concluded that the
county auditor failed to perform his statutory duty, approving the plaintiff's
claim for attorneys' fees, by delegating his duty to the board of judges.36'
The court held, therefore, that the court appointed attorney could compel
the county auditor to assume the duty he delegated to the board of judges
and to examine and approve his or her attorneys' fees claims. 362
D. Liability of Officers and Employees363
In United States v. Davis364 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed
and affirmed a trial court's conviction of guards at a state mental hospital,
under 18 U.S.C. section 241,365 for conspiring to violate the civil rights of a
hospital patient. The United States accused the guards of beating a patient.
Although the guards did not dispute that they beat the patient, they argued
on appeal that insufficient evidence existed to support a finding that they
acted in a conspiracy. 366 The court disagreed, however, and noted that the
concert element of conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence as
well as by the existence of a common motive. 367 The court then recognized
that the evidence supported findings that the guards shared a common mo-
tive of preventing patients from testifying before an abuse committee, that
the guards acted jointly in the beatings, and that the guards cooperated in
covering up their conduct. 368 Accordingly, the court affirmed the jury's con-
viction that the state hospital guards conspired to violate the hospital pa-
tient's civil rights.369
In Collin County v. Homeowners Association for Values Essential to Neigh-
borhoods370 a federal district judge held that county commissioners and a
county judge enjoy absolute legislative immunity from liability. In Home-
owners Association Collin County sought a declaratory judgment stating the
sufficiency of a final environmental impact statement for a proposed state
highway and enjoining the defendant homeowners association from interfer-
ing with the construction of the highway. The defendant filed counterclaims
against the county judge and the county commissioners alleging their viola-
tion of the defendant's civil rights, malicious prosecution, and abuse of legal
process. In considering the counter-defendants' motion to dismiss based on
absolute legislative immunity, the court ruled that local legislators are abso-
360. Id. at 790 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1660 (Vernon 1962)).
361. 728 S.W.2d at 790.
362. Id. The court did so after concluding that it had jurisdiction to issue a writ of manda-
mus in this context since the instant case involved a criminal law matter. Id. at 788-89. The
court concluded that a civil suit would be an inadequate remedy for the attorney. Id. at 792.
363. See also Tort Liability, supra section V.
364. 810 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1987).
365. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982) prohibits "two or more persons [from] conspir[ing] to injure,
oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States ..
366. 810 F.2d at 476.
367. Id. at 477 (citations omitted).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. 654 F. Supp. 943, 949-50 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
[Vol. 42
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
lutely immune from liability for conduct within the scope of their legislative
duties.371 Nevertheless, the court noted that such immunity exists only for
actions that the officers take as part of their legitimate legislative activity.372
In its counterclaims, the defendant alleged that the commissioners conspired
to injure it, that the commissioners' actions were ultra vires, and that the
commissioners acted outside their capacity as public officials. The court
noted that the commissioners' absolute legislative immunity defense would
not prevail if the defendant could support its allegations in the counterclaims
with specific facts.373 After reviewing the counterclaims and relying on Elli-
ott v. Perez,374 the court stated that the broad allegations that the defendant
made could not overcome the commissioners' immunity defense and thus
granted the commissioners' motion to dismiss.375
Concerning the county judge, the court noted that Texas county judges
may act in a legislative capacity. 376 The court then concluded that the
county judge also enjoyed absolute legislative immunity and granted his mo-
tion to dismiss.377 The court, however, did allow the defendant leave to
amend its counterclaims in order to allege specific supporting facts.378
E. Constitutionality of Abolition of Justice of the Peace Positions
In McCraw v. Vickers 379 the court of appeals held that the Bexar County
commissioners court's abolition of three justice of the peace positions did not
violate any state constitutional provisions or the due process rights of pro-
spective candidates for such positions.380 After providing notice and an op-
portunity for concerned citizens to be heard, the commissioners court passed
a "judicial abolition order," abolishing three justice of the peace positions in
Bexar County. The plaintiffs argued that the judicial abolition order directly
violated article 5, section 18 of the Texas Constitution. 381 The controversy
concerned whether section 18(a) required an additional justice of the peace
whenever the population of a city partly in the precinct exceeded 18,000 or
only when the population of a city wholly in the precinct exceeded 18,000.
The court noted that section 18 of article 5 is merely for the convenience of
371. Id at 949 (citations omitted).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985).
375. 654 F. Supp. at 949 (citing Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d at 1479).
376. Id. at 949 n.7 (citing Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 1980)).
377. Id.
378. Id. at 954. The court recognized, nevertheless, that one method of preventing merit-
less suits against public officials is rigid enforcement of FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and indicated its
intent to scrutinize closely any amended counterclaims. 654 F. Supp. at 954.
379. 717 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986) writ conditionally granted on other
grounds, 722 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1987).
380. Id at 744-45.
381. "[I]n each precinct there shall be elected one Justice of the Peace and one Constable
... provided that ... in any precinct in which there may be a city of 18,000 or more inhabit-




the people38 2 and held that section 18(a) requires a city of 18,000 or more
residents to be completely within a precinct in order to have an additional
justice of the peace. 383 Since all parties stipulated that no incorporated city
with a population of 18,000 or more inhabitants is wholly within a single
justice of the peace precinct in Bexar County, the court overruled the plain-
tiffs' constitutional claim.3 8 4
The plaintiffs also alleged that, since the judicial abolition order did not
become effective until after they filed for election to the office of justice of the
peace, they were denied due process of law. In rejecting this claim, the court
noted that no constitutional or statutory time limit exists on a county's abil-
ity to abolish a justice of the peace position, that neither plaintiff held a
property interest since each had merely filed for the office, and that the
plaintiffs received appropriate notice3 5 of the hearings on the proposed judi-
cial abolition order. 38 6 Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the
trial court upholding the judicial abolition order. 38 7
VI. POLICE POWER
During the Survey period several courts discussed the police power of lo-
cal governments. In Lindsay v. City of San Antonio3 88 several businesses
engaged in leasing and selling portable signs alleged that a city ordinance
prohibiting such signs was unconstitutional. In granting a preliminary in-
junction to plaintiffs, the district court treated the prohibition as a content
neutral ordinance affecting commercial and noncommercial speech
equally.38 9 The district court found a substantial likelihood that plaintiffs
would succeed on the merits because the city failed to show that the ordi-
nance furthers its goal of improving the city's aesthetic appearance and be-
cause, even if the ordinance furthered the city's aesthetic interest, a more
narrowly tailored ordinance could achieve the same effect. 39
On review, 391 the court of appeals concluded that the ordinance furthered
382. 717 S.W.2d at 743 (citing Williams v. Castleman, 112 Tex. 193, 247 S.W. 263 (Tex.
1922) (further citations omitted)).
383. Id
384. Id.
385. The court concluded that notice complied with the requirements of the Open Meet-
ings Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
386. 717 S.W.2d at 744-45.
387. Id. at 745.
388. 821 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1987).
389. The district court applied a test enunciated in City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789 (1984), which provides that:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmen-
tal interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 805.
390. 821 F.2d at 1106. The district court also concluded that a more narrowly tailored
ordinance could also serve the city's other asserted interest of furthering traffic safety. Id.
391. The court initially addressed the scope of review and declined to limit its focus to an
examination of whether the district court's issuance of the preliminary injunction was an abuse
of discretion. Rather, the court relied upon Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir.
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the city's interest in aesthetics. 392 The court noted that total realization of
the governmental goal is not mandatory; rather, furtherance of the govern-
mental interest may justify a specific restriction on speech. 393 The court of
appeals, unlike the district court, concluded that the ordinance did not have
an inconsequential effect, notwithstanding the proliferation of nonportable
signs in a particular area.394 In concluding that the city's total ban on porta-
ble signs was not substantially broader than necessary, the court recognized
that portable signs, like billboards and posted signs, by their very nature, can
harm a city aesthetically, regardless of where they are located and however
they are constructed. 395 Accordingly, the court upheld the ordinance as a
valid exercise of the city's police power.396
In Olvera v. State397 a group of picketers challenged the constitutionality
of a statute making mass picketing a misdemeanor. 398 After the district
court convicted the defendants of the misdemeanor of mass picketing, they
challenged the picketing statute as arbitrarily overbroad. Although the stat-
ute was content neutral, the court of appeals recognized that picketing con-
tains elements of both speech and conduct.399 Applying a four-part test set
out in United States v. O'Brien,4°° the court concluded first that the state
may regulate the use of city streets and facilities for the public's safety and
convenience. 401 Second, the state has a substantial governmental interest in
public safety and in preventing violence before it occurs.4° 2 Third, when a
picketing statute is content neutral and applies to all picketing, it is unre-
lated to the exercise of free expression.403 Fourth, the statute did not unrea-
sonably interfere with speech or the distribution of information. 4°4
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment and
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984), and Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987),
for the proposition that it need not rely heavily on the findings of fact made by the district
court. 821 F.2d at 1107-08.
392. 821 F.2d at 1110.
393. Id. at 1109.
394. Id. at 1109-10.
395. Id. at 1111 (citing Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808).
396. Id. at 1112.
397. 725 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
398. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d (Vernon 1987) provides: "Mass picketing
[includes] any form of picketing in which... [t]here are more than two (2) pickets at any time
within either fifty (50) feet of any entrance to the premises being picketed, or within fifty (50)
feet of another picket or pickets .... " Id.
399. 725 S.W.2d at 402 (citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147).
400. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968): [1] If [the regulation] is within the constitutional
power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
401. 725 S.W.2d at 402.
402. Id. at 402-03.
403. Id. at 403.
404. Id. at 404. Although acknowledging that federal district courts had recently struck
down the statute on overbreadth grounds, the court noted that those courts failed to recognize
the reasoning of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Sherman v. State, 626 S.W.2d 520,
526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). 725 S.W.2d at 404 (citing Nash v. Texas, 632 F. Supp. 951 (E.D.
Tex. 1986); Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Tex.
1985)). In Sherman the court of criminal appeals found that the prevention of violence is a
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upheld the constitutionality of the mass picketing statute.40 5
In Boiling v. Texas Animal Health Commission 406 the trial court upheld
the constitutionality of chapter 163 of the Agriculture Code4° 7 enabling the
commission, pursuant to a Brucellosis control program, to brand and
slaughter cattle that had been exposed to Brucellosis.408 The plaintiff in
Boiling argued that the Brucellosis control program was an unreasonable
exercise of the police power and effected a taking without compensation.
Rejecting these arguments, the court noted that to survive a constitutional
challenge, an economic regulation need only rationally relate to a state's le-
gitimate interest.4°9 As a result, the court upheld the constitutionality of the
control program, even though the program may not be the best possible
method of controlling Brucellosis. 410 In addition, the court stated that
merely because the control program deprived the owner of the highest price
he might receive for his cattle, it was not an unconstitutional taking.41' The
court found, instead, that the control program was a legitimate exercise of.
the police power. 412
In Citizens for Better Education v. Goose Creek Consolidated Independent
School District41 3 the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment
that a school board has the power to constitutionally adopt a rezoning plan
in order to promote an equal ethnic balance in the district's schools.414 Per-
ceiving that demographic shifts within their school district had altered the
ethnic composition of the two high schools within the district, the district
trustees adopted a rezoning plan changing the attendance zones for both
schools. Although the plaintiffs argued that no court ordered desegregation
plan required the rezoning, the court held that court ordered desegration is
not a prerequisite to a school board's efforts to achieve integration.41 5 In
addition, the court noted that school authorities are vested with broad, dis-
cretionary powers to formulate educational policy.4 16 The court concluded
valid state interest justifying some first amendment infringement. Sherman v. State, 626
S.W.2d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
405. Olvera, 725 S.W.2d at 404.
406. 718 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
407. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 161.131 (Vernon 1982).
*408. Id.
409. 718 S.W.2d at 820 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124
(1978)).
410. Id. at 821.
411. Id.
412. Id. (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Nunley v. Texas Animal
Health Comm'n, 471 S.W.2d 144, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
413. 719 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal
dism'd w.o.j., 108 S. Ct. 49 (1987).
414. Id. at 354-55.
415. Id. at 352.
416. Id. (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)). The
court also noted that TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 23.26(b) (Vernon 1987) exclusively empowers
school trustees to manage and govern the public schools within their district and that it would
not interfere with such power unless there is a clear abuse of power and discretion. 719
S.W.2d at 354 (citing Nichols v. Aldine Indep. School Dist., 356 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1962, no writ); Kissick v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 330 S.W.2d 708, 710
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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that because the rezoning plan, although premised on racial inequality, was
designed to promote integration, it should review the plaintiffs' equal protec-
tion claims under a "rational basis" analysis, rather than a "strict scrutiny"
analysis.417 Nevertheless, the court found, even under strict scrutiny, the
rezoning plan would stand because providing an integrated education is a
compelling interest,418 because the plan was the least disruptive plan that the
school district reviewed, and because the plan was substantially related to
the district's interest of providing an integrated education. 419 Accordingly,
the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.420
The Texas Supreme Court, in State v. Project Principle, Inc.,421 heard an
appeal from a temporary injunction prohibiting literacy and competency
testing of currently certified public school teachers.422 The supreme court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that its equal protection claim was subject
to strict scrutiny analysis. Drawing from the teachings of Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners,423 the court concluded that the right to teach is not fun-
damental and held that the challenged competency testing was rationally
related to the state's interest in maintaining competent teachers in public
schools. 424 Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court
and dissolved that court's injunction.425
In Hope v. Village of Laguna Vista 426 the court of appeals reviewed a
resident's challenge to the authority of a general law city to assess funds
from a public improvement district in order to dredge a boat channel outside
its city limits. The trial court ruled that the city could assess residents in
order to finance the dredging of the channel. The court of appeals, however,
disagreed. The court noted that a city must have express statutory authority
to exercise its powers beyond its limits unless its extra-territorial exercise of
power is reasonably incident to its express powers.427 The court then con-
cluded that the city erroneously relied on two statutory provisions as author-
417. 719 S.W.2d at 352 (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973)).
418. Id. at 353 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
419. Id.
420. Id. at 352-53. The court held that the rezoning plan did not constitute a "transfer" so
as to fall within the restrictive provisions of TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.074, 21.075
(Vernon 1987) (disallowing transfers by general or blanket order and requiring a hearing in the
case of each transfer of a pupil from one school to another within the district).
421. 724 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1987).
422. The requirement for the examination, known as the Texas Examination for Current
Administrators and Teachers (TECAT), is located in TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.047
(Vernon Supp. 1988).
423. 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (holding that a person's interest in practicing law is not a
fundamental right).
424. 724 S.W.2d at 391.
425. Id. at 392. The court also concluded that § 13.047 did not impair contract rights in
violation of TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16 since a teaching certificate is not a contract. 724 S.W.2d
at 390. The court held that § 13.047 did not violate due process because it contained numer-
ous provisions insuring that teachers taking the TECAT receive due process. Id. at 390-91.
426. 721 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
427. Id. at 463-64 (citing City of Austin v. Jamail, 662 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1983, writ dism'd)). The court also noted that doubts about the existence of a power
are resolved against a city. Id. at 464 (citing City of West Lake Hills v. Westwood Legal Def.
Fund, 598 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ)).
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ization for its assessment. 428 The first statute authorizes cities to build
canals. 429 The court pointed out, however, that the statute only authorizes
cities to fund their canals by issuing negotiable revenue bonds or by ob-
taining loans and grants. 430 What is more, according to the court, the stat-
ute mandates that any such canals or channels be within the city rate
limits.43 ' The second statute432 allows cities to assess funds for certain de-
fined public improvements.433 The court concluded, however, that the stat-
ute's failure to allow assessments for a public improvement outside the city
limits precluded the application of the statute in support of the city's assess-
ments.434 Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court
and rendered void the city's assessments for the channel dredging.435
VII. ZONING AND PLANNING
During the Survey period, courts considered numerous issues stemming
from the termination and amortization of nonconforming property uses. In
Murmur Corp. v. Board of Adjustment 436the owner of a lead smelter, Mur-
mur,437 brought an action to review an order of the board of adjustment of
the City of Dallas, immediately terminating Murmur's alleged nonconform-
ing use of the smelter. The trial court upheld the board's order and issued a
permanent injunction restraining Murmur's operation of the smelter. On
appeal, the court of appeals concluded that Dallas's ordinance was valid and
applied to Murmur.438 Nevertheless, the court found that no substantial
evidence supported the trial court's implied finding that Murmur had no
investment in the smelter. 439 As a result, the court ruled that Murmur was
entitled to continue its use of the smelter for a period of time sufficient to
enable it to amortize or recoup its investment.440 The court rejected Mur-
mur's challenge that the Dallas zoning ordinance"' was invalid because the
city failed to provide statutory notice of its proposed adoption." 2 Relying
428. 721 S.W.2d at 464.
429. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1187e, § l(a) (repealed and codified as TEX. LOCAL
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 43.121 (Vernon 1988)).
430. 721 S.W.2d at 464 (quoting TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1187e, § 6(c) (repealed
and codified as TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 43.121 (Vernon Pam. 1988)).
431. Id.
432. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269j-4.12 (repealed and codified as TEX. LOCAL
GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 372.001-.030 (Vernon Pam. 1988).
433. 721 S.W.2d at 464 (art. 1269j-4.12, § 2(b)).
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. 718 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
437. At a public auction sale ordered by the FTC in 1984, Murmur acquired from RSR
Corporation the nonconforming smelter as well as 26.7 acres of land. Consideration for the
sale included a payment of $25,000 and various representations that Murmur would continue
to operate the plant, would install pollution-control equipment, and would comply with perti-
nent environmental regulations. Id. at 801.
438. Id. at 793.
439. Id. at 791-92.
440. Id.
441. DALLAS DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 51-3.102(c)(4), 51-4.704(a)(1) (1983).
442. 718 S.W.2d at 792. The notice requirement is identified in TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
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upon the enactment of validating statutes" 3 and upon City of Hutchins v.
Prasifka,444 the court concluded that the irregularity in the city's adoption of
the zoning ordinance did not affect Murmur's constitutional rights." 5 Fur-
thermore, according to the court, the validating statutes cured any other
defects. 446
Next, the court addressed the appropriate standard to determine the
amortization period of nonconforming uses. After carefully considering the
leading Texas authorities," 7 the court concluded that recovery of the "full
value" of the nonconforming structure is not the standard which determines
the length of the amortization period. Rather, the court concluded, the ap-
propriate standard is that length of time that allows the property owner to
recover its investment in the structure at the time of the zoning change.448
The court also reconciled two seemingly conflicting provisions of the zoning
ordinance: one providing for the amortization of the full value of the struc-
ture449 and the other providing for recoupment of the investment in the non-
conforming use.450 In concluding that the term "full value" means
"investment," the court noted that the term "value" is susceptible to numer-
ous meanings depending on the particular context, 45l that a court should
give weight to the board's interpretation of the terms, 452 that the zoning
ordinance's predecessor defined the term "investment," 453 and that a
"value" standard is tautological since the value of the land and the length of
the amortization period are mutually interdependent. 454 Accordingly, the
court concluded that the city must allow Murmur a reasonable time to re-
cover its investment in the smelter before the city could order Murmur to
abandon the smelter as a nonconforming use.455 In light of its conclusion,
the court also found that the ordinance did not effect an unconstitutional
"taking" of Murmur's property since the amortization of a nonconforming
use is not the same as compensation for property taken for public use.456
The court concluded that the board and the trial court improperly offset
ANN. art. 101If(b) (repealed and codified as TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 211.007
(Vernon Supp. Pam. 1988)).
443. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 974d-22, § 4 (repealed), art. 1174a-10, § 2(b)
(repealed).
444. 450 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 1970).
445. 718 S.W.2d at 793.
446. Id.
447. City of Univ. Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 777-78 (Tex. 1972); Lubbock Poster
Co. v. City of Lubbock, 569 S.W.2d 935, 941-42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979).
448. 718 S.W.2d at 794-95.
449. DALLAS DEVELOPMENT CODE § 51-3.102(c)(4) (1983).
450. Id. § 51-4.704(a)(1).
451. 718 S.W.2d at 795-96.
452. Id. at 796 (citing Texans to Save the Capitol, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 647 S.W.2d
773, 776-77 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
453. Id. (citing White v. City of Dallas, 517 S.W.2d 344, 348-49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1974, no writ); City of Dallas v. Fifley, 359 S.W.2d 177, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
454. Id. at 796-97.
455. Id. at 797.
456. Id at 798.
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Murmur's $25,000 investment by the value of the land under the smelter
(adjusted for costs of closure, demolition and salvage). 457 Inasmuch as the
court could not ascertain any support for the board's implied finding that
Murmur did not have a substantial investment in the smelter, the court con-
cluded that the order for immediate termination was an abuse of discretion,
vacated the order, dissolved the injunction preventing use of the smelter, and
remanded the action to the district court for further consideration. 458
In Neighborhood Committee on Lead Pollution v. Board of Adjustment 459
the same court of appeals addressed additional challenges to the provisions
of the Dallas Development Code it had previously reviewed in Murmur.460
The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court affirming a board order
requiring Dixie Metals to terminate its smelting operation on December 31,
1990. In doing so, the court rejected Dixie Metals' argument that the ordi-
nance did not encompass its lead-smelting operation since the ordinance ap-
plies only to smelting and plating facilities. 461 The court noted that courts
must interpret the conjunctive "and" to mean "or" when the context re-
quires such interpretation.4 62 The court noted that numerous other provi-
sions of the Dallas Development Code used the terms interchangeably.46 3
The court also rejected Dixie Metals' argument that the board should
have taken into account the court ordered investments that Dixie Metals
made subsequent to the zoning change, without which Dixie Metals could
not have continued its operations. 464 The court recognized that the amorti-
zation technique that the board used need not provide exact compensation to
the holder of the nonconforming use.4 65 In addition, the court recognized
that additional investment to meet environmental standards is no different
from additional investment to meet technological changes and that in both
cases allowing amortization of such investments frustrates the public's inter-
est in terminating nonconforming uses.4 6 6 Accordingly, the court affirmed
the lower court judgment upholding the board's order.467
In City of Houston v. Harris County Outdoor Advertising Association 468
the Houston court of appeals addressed an apparent conflict between the
457. Id. at 801. In his concurring opinion, Justice Witham recognized that amortization
avoids any eminent domain considerations since the owner is reasonably compensated for the
loss of his nonconforming use and, therefore, nothing is "taken." Nevertheless, he recognized
that amortization "loses its nature as an exercise of police power when the owner's investment
in the land is used, in whole or in part, to erase 'the full value of the structure' from considera-
tion, as was done in the present case." Id. at 809 (quoting DALLAS DEVELOPMENT CODE
§ 51-3.102 (1983)).
458. Id. at 802.
459. 728 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
460. DALLAS DEVELOPMENT CODE § 51-4.216(13) (1983).
461. 728 S.W.2d at 72.
462. Id. at 68 (citing Board of Ins. Comm'r v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 Tex. 630, 180
S.W.2d 906 (1944)).
463. Id. at 68-69.
464. Id. at 70.
465. Id. at 71.
466. Id. at 70-71.
467. Id. at 72.
468. 732 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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federal Highway Beautification Act,469 Texas's own sign statutes470 and
Houston's sign code47 1 as well as the constitutionality of a provision of one
of the state sign statutes. Initially, the city challenged the trial court's con-
clusion that the city's sign code was inapplicable to signs and billboards lo-
cated in areas within the city designated as federal corridors.472 The court of
appeals agreed with the city that the city's sign code applied to federal corri-
dors for several reasons. First, the court noted that the HBA specifically
allows states to establish limitations more strict than the federal limitations
with respect to signs on federal-aid highway systems.473 Second, the court
pointed out that the city sign code does not conflict with any provision of the
HBA and thus the city is free to enact ordinances covering the same subject
as the HBA.474 Third, the court opined that Houston, as a home rule city
that derives its power not from the legislature, but from article XI, section 5
of the Texas Constitution, could enact any ordinance consistent with the
Texas Constitution or laws.47 5 Accordingly, the court disagreed with the
trial court's conclusion that the sign code does not apply to federal highway
signs.476
The appellate court also reviewed the trial court's holding that the board's
order improperly allowed the plaintiffs to amortize their investment in signs
situated within the federal corridor. 477 The trial court had concluded that
since the federal Highway Beautification Act requires cities to compensate
individuals when a city enacts an ordinance requiring them to remove their
signs, the city may not regulate such signs without compensation. 478 The
court of appeals stated that the trial court improperly relied upon testimony
of the house sponsor of H.B. 1330 in order to ascertain that the legislature
intended the statute to exclude federal highway signs from the amortization
plan.479 The court then reiterated its conclusion that the federal Highway
469. The Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1982) (HBA).
470. The Texas Litter Abatement Act art. IV, "Highway Beautification," TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4477-9a (Vernon Supp. 1988) (TLAA); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts.
1015o, 1015o-1 (repealed and codified as TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 216.001-.015
(Vernon Pam. 1988) (H.B. 1330)).
471. HOUSTON UNIFORM BUILDING CODE ch. 46 (sign code).
472. The court noted that the HBA is a voluntary federal law providing "for the effective
control of signs within federal corridors (areas within 660 feet of the edge of interstate and
federal aid primary system rights-of-way)." 732 S.W.2d at 44.
473. Id. at 48.
474. Id. (citing Prescott v. City of Borger, 158 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1942, writ ref'd)). The court also noted that the TLAA, passed by the Texas Legislature in
compliance with the HBA, authorizes the adoption of rules by the State Highway and Public
Transportation Commissions for the regulation of signs; further, the state regulations allow the
state's political subdivisions to regulate outdoor advertising signs. Specifically, TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1175, § 24 (repealed) authorizes home rule cities, like Houston, to "li-
cense, regulate, control or prohibit erection of signs or bill boards as may be provided by the
charter or ordinance."
475. 732 S.W.2d at 48 (citing McDonald v. City of Houston, 577 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
476. Id. at 48-49.
477. Id. at 48 (discussing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1015o, 1015-1 (repealed and
codified as TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 216.001-.015 (Vernon 1987)).
478. 732 S.W.2d at 49.
479. Id. at 49 (citing Commissioners Court v. El Paso Sheriff's Deputies Ass'n, 620 S.W.2d
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Beautification Act enables states to impose regulations more strict than the
minimum regulations which it contains.480 In addition, the court noted that
neither the federal nor state signs acts precluded the board from initiating
actions short of removing the signs.481
Finally, the appellate court addressed and disagreed with the trial court's
conclusion that the term "useful life" 482 contained in H.B. 1330 is vague
and, therefore, violates the plaintiffs' due process rights.483 Initially, the
court recognized that a statute being challenged on constitutional grounds is
entitled to a presumption of validity and that a statute that does not expose a
potential actor to risk or detriment without giving him adequate notice of
the nature of the prohibited conduct is not fatally vague.4 84 The court also
recognized that since H.B. 1330 creates no penal offenses, but rather allows
for the regulation of the billboard industry, the court need not apply the
strictest form of the adequate notice test.48 5 Although it noted that the term
"useful life" is potentially vague, the court found that the term is not vague
in the context of taxation, depreciation of assets, and amortization; 486 simi-
larly, the court concluded that "useful life" is not vague in the context of
H.B. 1330.487 Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial
court and rendered that the association take nothing.4
88
900 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). For an explanation of the operation
and validity of amortization plans, see id. at 49-50.
480. Id. at 49.
481. Id. (such actions not tantamount to removal include requiring a reduction in size or
height of the sign or designating signs within the federal corridor to comply with the sign code
if compliance can be effected at a cost of 15% or less of the value of the signs).
482. "Useful life" is found in H.B. 1330, art. 1, § 6(h) which provides:
[F]or signs that the Board verifies cannot be brought into compliance at the cost
of 15 percent or less, the board shall determine the entire useful life of those
signs by type of category, such as the categories of mono-pole signs, metal signs,
and wood signs. The useful life may not be solely determined by the natural life
expectancy of a sign.
483. 732 S.W.2d at 49.
484. Id. at 50 (citing Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1980); Texas
Liquor Control Bd. v. Attic Club, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1970)).
485. Id. at 51 (quoting Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980)).
486. Id. (citations omitted).
487. Id. The court also noted that H.B. 1330 provides numerous procedural safeguards to
insure sound decisions and fair treatment. Id.
488. Id. at 57.
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